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ARTICLE
IMMORAL TRADEMARKS AFTER BRUNETTI
Ned Snow
ABSTRACT
Trademark law has recently experienced a fundamental shift.
For more than a century, marks that were vulgar, profane, and
obscene could not receive trademark protection. In 2019, however,
the Supreme Court in Iancu v. Brunetti invalidated the statutory
provision that had prevented such marks from receiving
protection—the bars to “immoral” and “scandalous” marks. Those
bars violated the First Amendment because they enabled the
government to judge whether ideas in marks were inappropriate.
Similarly, two years prior to Brunetti, the Court in Matal v. Tam
struck down a bar to marks that could “disparage” others. The
Court reasoned that to disparage is to offend, and the ability to
offend is a core First Amendment value. So in the wake of Brunetti
and Tam, the public must now be exposed to marks that employ
highly offensive expression. Racial epithets, the F-word, and
pornography are now more likely to appear as brands. And as time
passes, businesses will gain confidence that such emotional
attention-grabbing expressions will continue to be eligible for
trademark protection. More businesses will begin to invest in
them. The public, in turn, will be subject to a commercial
experience that is more offensive and less inviting.
Congress must therefore act. Congress must bar trademark
registration for the specific categories of vulgar, profane, and

Ray Taylor Fair Professor of Law, University of South Carolina. The Author
thanks Professor Lisa Ramsey for her insightful comments and valuable criticism. The
Author also recognizes the helpful views provided by the participants of the 2019 Texas
A&M Intellectual Property Scholars Roundtable. Finally, the Author appreciates the
excellent editorial and research assistance provided by Andi McDonald.

401

58 HOUS. L. REV. 401 (2020)

402

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[58:2

obscene language. Unlike the bars in Brunetti and Tam, these bars
would not violate the First Amendment. They would target modes
of expression—offensive methods of communication that invoke
emotive force. The offensiveness of the communication derives not
from any idea contained in a mark, but from the particular
language employed. That distinction makes a constitutional
difference. Modes of expression can be restricted in certain
circumstances, such as the trademark context: the restriction
furthers the trademark purpose of creating a commercial
environment that is inviting to consumers. Congress may and
should deny protection.
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I.INTRODUCTION
Two recent Supreme Court cases call into question whether
Congress may condition trademark registration on moral criteria.
In Matal v. Tam and Iancu v. Brunetti, the Court ruled that
Congress could not bar registration for marks that “disparage”
others or that are “immoral” or “scandalous.”1 The disparagement,
immoral, and scandalous bars all targeted offensive speech, and
the right to speak offensive ideas represents a core First
Amendment value.2 Striking down a century of statutory
precedent, the Court chose to protect businesses’ interests in
speaking over the public’s interest in avoiding offensive marks.3
Tam and Brunetti, however, do not imply that trademark law
must altogether divorce itself from morality. In particular, the
cases do not imply that Congress must extend trademark
protection to all vulgar, profane, and obscene expression. Those
forms of expression represent modes of communicating an idea,
and regulating a mode of expression is very different from
regulating the idea within the expression.4 Indeed, the Brunetti
Court explicitly left open the possibility for Congress to bar
immoral modes of expressing marks.5 Some Justices even noted in
their concurrences that bars to vulgar, profane, and obscene marks
would be constitutional.6 Thus, the First Amendment may yet
allow for Congress to deny trademark protection for certain types
of immoral marks.
The question thus arises as to whether Congress should
respond to Tam and Brunetti by denying trademark protection for
expression that employs vulgar, profane, and obscene language.
1.
Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2302 (2019); Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744,
1765 (2017).
2.
Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2300–01; Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1751, 1763.
3.
See Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (barring protection
for “immoral” and “scandalous” marks), invalidated in part by Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2297;
Trademark Act of 1905, Pub. L. No. 84, § 5(a), 33 Stat. 724, 725 (prohibiting trademark
registration for scandalous or immoral matter), repealed by 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a).
4.
See discussion infra Section III.B.1.
5.
See Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2302 n.*.
6.
See id. at 2303 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(“[R]efusing registration to obscene, vulgar, or profane marks does not offend the First
Amendment.”); id. at 2303 (Alito, J., concurring) (“Our decision does not prevent Congress
from adopting a more carefully focused statute that precludes the registration of marks
containing vulgar terms that play no real part in the expression of ideas.”); id. at 2306
(Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[I]t is hard to see how a statute
prohibiting the registration of only highly vulgar or obscene words discriminates based on
‘viewpoint.’”); id. at 2318 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“With
‘scandalous’ narrowed to reach only obscene, profane, and vulgar content, the provision
would not be overly broad.”).
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This Article argues that Congress should deny protection and that
doing so would not violate the First Amendment. The policy
argument for denying protection is based on three premises.7 The
first premise is that the public deems the use of vulgar, profane,
and obscene language to be highly offensive and immoral.8 That
language is crude, coarse, and base—usually employed solely to
evoke emotional emphasis.9 Therefore, the law should not
encourage its use.
The second premise posits that the forum of commercial
advertising is particularly unsuited for vulgar, profane, and
obscene language.10 The public expects commercial actors to
present their goods through means that are inviting and nonoffensive.11 The law has traditionally upheld this expectation,
punishing actors who use offensive methods of presentation such
as robocalls and spam e-mail.12 Furthermore, the use of highly
offensive language in advertising impedes a robust commercial
marketplace.13 Some segments of the public will either severely
limit their exposure to advertising or change their consumption
choices, and this will negatively affect commercial productivity.14
Hence, to uphold the expectations of the public and to prevent
disruption of commercial activity, the law should discourage the
use of highly offensive language in commercial advertising.
This leads to the third and final premise—that trademark law
would be an effective means of deterring the use of such language
in commercial advertising.15 By denying the language trademark
protection, Congress would create a strong financial incentive for
businesses to avoid using the language in their marks.16 Indeed,
the Trademark Act (the Lanham Act) already denies protection for
certain content in order to deter people from using that content:
the Act bars registration for content that is deceptive, descriptive,

7.
See discussion infra Part III.
8.
See discussion infra Section III.A.
9.
See discussion infra Section III.A.
10.
See discussion infra Section III.B.
11.
See discussion infra Section III.B.1.
12.
See 15 U.S.C. § 7704(a)(4), (d) (barring unsolicited spam e-mail of a commercial
or pornographic content); 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(B) (barring robocalls).
13.
See discussion infra Section III.B.2.
14.
See discussion infra Section III.B.2.
15.
See discussion infra Section III.C.
16.
See discussion infra Section III.C.
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or confusingly similar to other marks.17 For that matter, the
Lanham Act denies protection for content based on moral reasons:
the Act bars registration for marks that portray deceased
presidents (to respect the president’s living spouse) or that portray
government insignia (to prevent sullying and debasing the
insignia).18 Denying protection for highly offensive language would
thus be consistent with existing trademark doctrine. Moreover,
doing so would support the central purpose of trademark law—to
serve the interests of consumers.19 Insofar as Congress acts soon—
before businesses start investing in highly offensive marks—
denying trademark protection would be an effective means to deter
vulgar, profane, and obscene language in commercial
advertising.20
But what about the First Amendment? After all, the Supreme
Court has protected vulgar expression as free speech.21 Yet some
Justices in the Brunetti case suggested in their concurrences that
trademark bars to highly offensive language would be
constitutional.22 The question must therefore be posed: Would
barring vulgar, profane, and obscene language from trademark
registration abridge the freedom of speech?23
This question calls for both a doctrinal and theoretical
response. Doctrinally, the question raises a preliminary issue
about whether denying trademark registration would constitute a
speech-suppressive act.24 Given that the denial would not preclude
anyone from using offensive language, is the denial an act of
abridgment? Although the Court’s rulings in Tam and Brunetti
imply that the denial would indeed constitute an abridgment, the
issue is still worth considering.25 In the end, the denial does appear

17.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a), (d)–(e). Note that the bar to descriptive marks applies
only if the mark has not gained secondary meaning. See id. § 1052(f); USPTO v.
Booking.com B.V., No. 19-46, slip op. at 3 (U.S. June 30, 2020) (“[T]o be placed on the
principal register, descriptive terms must achieve significance ‘in the minds of the public’
as identifying the applicant’s goods or services—a quality called ‘acquired distinctiveness’
or ‘secondary meaning.’” (quoting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 211
(2000))).
18.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(b), (c); discussion infra Section III.C.1.
19.
See discussion infra Section III.C.1.
20.
See discussion infra Section III.C.2.
21.
See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25–26 (1971) (protecting F-word on jacket
that communicated opinion about the federal draft).
22.
See supra note 6.
23.
See discussion infra Part IV.
24.
See discussion infra Section IV.A.1.
25.
See discussion infra Section IV.A.1.
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to constitute an abridgment because trademark restrictions
influence choices about which speech to use as a mark.26
The next issue is whether bars to vulgar, profane, and obscene
marks should be analyzed under a speech doctrine that allows for
content-based restrictions in certain circumstances.27 More
specifically, the issue is whether the doctrine of limited public
forums should apply to the trademark context.28 That doctrine
applies where the government extends a resource to facilitate
private speech.29 Content-based restrictions are permissible if they
further a purpose of the government resource and if they are
viewpoint neutral.30 Here, the trademark system represents a
resource that Congress extends to sellers of goods in order to
facilitate trademark usage.31 Content restrictions on trademark
registration are therefore justifiable if they further a purpose of
trademark law and are viewpoint neutral. The restriction on
highly offensive language furthers a purpose of trademark law—
i.e., promoting commercial transactions.32
With respect to the issue of viewpoint neutrality, the analysis
is more nuanced.33 In Tam, the Court held that Congress’s attempt
to bar disparaging marks was viewpoint discriminatory,34 and in
support of that holding, a plurality opined that “[g]iving offense is
a viewpoint.”35 In Brunetti, a unanimous Court held that
Congress’s attempt to bar “immoral” marks was similarly
viewpoint discriminatory.36 In view of these holdings, how can a
bar to vulgar, profane, and obscene marks be viewpoint-neutral if
the reason for the bar is that such marks are considered to be
offensive and immoral? The answer is simple. Tam and Brunetti
recognized that the bars to disparaging and immoral marks
targeted the ideas within the marks.37 They restricted offensive
ideas. By contrast, the bars to vulgar, profane, and obscene marks
would target the modes of expressing those ideas.38 These bars
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

See discussion infra Section IV.A.1.
See discussion infra Section IV.A.2.
See discussion infra Section IV.A.2.
See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995).
See id.
See discussion infra Section IV.A.2.
See discussion infra Section IV.A.2.
See discussion infra Section IV.B.
Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1763 (2017).
Id. (plurality opinion).
Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2297, 2303 (2019).
See discussion infra Sections IV.B.1–2.
See discussion infra Section IV.B.3.
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restrict only offensive modes because they serve only to provide
emphasis, akin to screaming one’s message.39 Although the mode
of using vulgar language certainly adds emotive force to a mark, it
does not communicate any specific viewpoint.40 Hence, barring
that mode of expression would be viewpoint-neutral.
From a theoretical standpoint, denying protection for vulgar,
profane, and obscene language seems appropriate under the
marketplace-of-ideas theory of free speech.41 That theory is most
relevant here because it reflects the purpose of speaking a message
through a trademark: just as ideas compete for public acceptance
in the marketplace of ideas, marks compete for consumer
recognition in the marketplace of commerce.42 Marketplace theory
suggests the appropriateness of discouraging highly offensive
marks because their offensiveness discourages full participation in
the commercial marketplace, and thereby the marketplace of
ideas.43 Highly offensive marks lead to messages getting lost in
their delivery. Therefore, the marketplace-of-ideas theory
recognizes value in barring such language in the trademark
context.
This Article concludes that Congress should bar trademark
registration for vulgar, profane, and obscene language. Part II sets
forth the specifics of this proposal, defining the meanings of these
terms and providing instruction for their proper application. Part
III argues that sound policy supports this proposal. Part IV
examines the First Amendment issues.
II.PROPOSAL
This Article proposes that Congress bar registration for
marks that employ vulgar, profane, or obscene language. This Part
explains that proposal. It describes the sort of expression that
these bars would target and how the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO) should apply these bars.
The meanings of vulgarity, profanity, and obscenity generally
consist of crude and base descriptions of certain subject matter,
and their definitions may overlap.44 They are generally offensive
to readers, and for this reason, this Article employs only referents
39.
See discussion infra Section IV.B.3.
40.
See discussion infra Section IV.B.3.
41.
See discussion infra Section IV.D.
42.
See discussion infra Section IV.D.
43.
See discussion infra Section IV.D.
44.
See ASHLEY MONTAGU, THE ANATOMY OF SWEARING 104–05 (1967) (defining
categories of swear words).
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to the particular words without full recitation of the words. First,
vulgarity consists of expressions that are lewdly indecent.45 This
includes coarse or crude references to private body parts, to the
sex act, and to certain bodily functions.46 The F-word and swear
words that refer to the excretory process (e.g., the S-word) may be
the most common examples of vulgar expression.47 Second,
profanity consists of expressions that desecrate figures that are
held sacred or holy by a segment of the public.48 This includes vain
references to holy religious figures, such as Jesus Christ, Jehovah,
or Muhammad, and could also include derogatory references to
particular races or cultures.49 Third, obscenity consists of
expressions “which, taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient
interest in sex, which portray sexual conduct in a patently
offensive way, and which, taken as a whole, do not have serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.”50 This includes
explicit portrayals of the sex act.51
In denying registration for these categories of marks, the PTO
should examine whether a particular mark employs vulgar,
profane, or obscene language (where language includes both words
45.
Vulgar, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/vulg
ar [https://perma.cc/LTE5-UYZ6] (last visited Sept. 18, 2020) (defining vulgar as “lewdly or
profanely indecent”).
46.
See Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2307 (2019) (Breyer, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (observing that vulgar expression has evolved over time “toward
words that are sexually explicit or that crudely describe bodily functions”). See generally
United States v. Biocic, 928 F.2d 112, 115–16 (4th Cir. 1991) (“The important government
interest [in the public indecency statute] is the widely recognized one of protecting the
moral sensibilities of that substantial segment of society that still does not want to be
exposed willy-nilly to public displays of various portions of their fellow citizens’ anatomies
that traditionally in this society have been regarded as erogenous zones. These still include
(whether justifiably or not in the eyes of all) the female, but not the male, breast.”).
47.
See generally FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 509 (2009)
(reciting and upholding FCC agency opinion stating that “the F-Word ‘is one of the most
vulgar, graphic and explicit descriptions of sexual activity in the English language’”
(quoting In re Complaints Against Various Broadcast Licensees Regarding Their Airing of
the “Golden Globe Awards” Program, 19 FCC Rcd. 4975, 4979 (2004))).
48.
Profane, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/prof
ane [https://perma.cc/A74G-QG28] (last visited Sept. 18, 2020) (defining profane as “serving
to debase or defile what is holy”); Profane, OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY, https://www-oed-com.
ezproxy.lib.uh.edu/view/Entry/152024?rskey=dl598B&result=1&isAdvanced=false#eid [ht
tps://perma.cc/GC5R-YJT2] (last visited Sept. 18, 2020) (defining profane as “characterized
by, exhibiting, or expressive of a disregard or contempt for sacred things (esp., in later use,
by the taking of God’s name in vain); not respectful of religious practice; irreverent,
blasphemous, impious; (hence, more generally) ribald, coarse, indecent”).
49.
See MONTAGU, supra note 44, at 100–01 (providing list of examples of profane
utterances). The Judeo-Christian tradition holds that God commanded people to refrain
from making vain references to the name of deity. Exodus 20:7.
50.
See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24–25 (1973) (defining legal obscenity).
51.
Id. at 25.
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and images52) as a means to express an idea. The PTO should not
deny protection if only the idea itself—rather than the language
used to express the idea—is highly offensive. The inquiry by the
PTO, then, should be into whether an average person would be
highly offended because the mark contains vulgar, profane, or
obscene language, but not because of a specific idea communicated
by the mark.53
A few examples illustrate this sort of analysis that the PTO
should employ. The first is an example of a vulgar mark that
expresses an idea that is not vulgar: F— THE DEVIL! Clearly the
idea of this example is not offensive: the idea represents an
imperative to harass and harm an evil being. The F-word,
however, is a vulgar word (a crude reference to sexual intercourse)
that is highly offensive to many people. Hence, the use of the
highly offensive word to express the non-offensive idea would
trigger the vulgarity bar.
Another example illustrates that a profane method of
expression (or vulgarity or obscenity) must be highly offensive to
be denied protection, and that marks that contain profane ideas
may still receive protection. Consider a mark that communicates
damnation to a religious figure. The word damn is a swear word
that may be mildly offensive to some portion of the population, but
not highly offensive.54 Nevertheless, for a religious group, the idea
contained within the phrase may be highly offensive, but not
because of the choice of the word damn; rather, the offense would
arise because of the idea of damning the religious figure, which is
communicated by the mark.55 Although this would constitute a
profane idea because it is highly irreverent toward a religious
figure, the words themselves used in the trademark do not
constitute profanity. There is no profane language in the mark
that serves to communicate the profane idea. Thus, it should not
be denied trademark registration.
52.
See COLIN CHERRY, ON HUMAN COMMUNICATION 275 (3d ed. 1978).
53.
Cf. Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2301 (2019) (explaining that the
Government proposed interpreting the scandalous bar so that it would apply only to “marks
that are offensive [or] shocking to a substantial segment of the public because of their mode
of expression” such that the PTO would refuse only “marks that are ‘vulgar’—meaning
‘lewd,’ ‘sexually explicit or profane’” (emphasis added)).
54.
Although damn may have been highly offensive at the time of Gone with the Wind,
today the word invokes merely mild offense. See KRISTY BEERS FÄGERSTEN, WHO’S
SWEARING NOW?: THE SOCIAL ASPECTS OF CONVERSATIONAL SWEARING 12 (2012) (noting
research that, taken together, suggests “damn” to be a “weaker” swear word).
55.
See generally Muhammad v. City of N.Y. Dep’t of Corr., 904 F. Supp. 161, 168
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (recognizing common belief among Muslims that Muhammad is the “seal
of the prophets” and the last prophet).
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By contrast, consider a phrase that uses the same name of the
religious figure, but with a different purpose—merely to use the
name in vane so as to express the speaker’s frustration. Such a
phrase debases the name in order to communicate an idea that is
not offensive (that someone is frustrated). The vain reference
would be a profane use of language, so the phrase would fall within
the scope of the profanity bar.
A final example illustrates the application of the obscenity
bar. Consider a mark that states OPEN ORGY and a mark that
displays a graphic depiction of an orgy. The OPEN ORGY mark
contains an idea (unrestrained group sex) that is highly offensive
to a significant portion of the public. It would not be denied
registration, however, because the method of expressing that idea
is not offensive. The words open and orgy represent non-offensive
means of communicating an idea. By contrast, the mark that
displays a graphic depiction of an orgy would be denied
registration on the grounds that the display constitutes a highly
offensive method (a graphic depiction) of expressing the same idea
(unrestrained group sex). The graphic depiction is obscene. The
fact that the method of expressing the idea also serves to express
the idea itself does not change the fact that the method of
expressing the idea is obscene. The depiction—even though a true
representation of the idea—is still highly offensive. It would be
denied protection under the obscenity bar.
III.POLICY
The reason to bar trademark registration for marks that
contain vulgar, profane, and obscene language is simple.56 The
public generally finds the use of such language to be highly
offensive and immoral, especially in the context of commercial
advertising, and trademark law is an effective means for limiting
such language in that context. This argument relies on three
premises, addressed in the Sections below. The first premise is
that the public generally deems the use of this language to be
highly offensive and immoral.57 The second is that the forum of
commercial advertising should conform to the public’s preferences
for proper methods of communicating commercial information.58
The third is that the system of trademarks represents an effective
56.
Professor Ilhyung Lee has made a similar proposal with regard to barring
trademark protection for racial epithets. See Ilhyung Lee, Essay, Tam Through the Lens of
Brunetti: THE SLANTS, FUCT, 69 EMORY L.J. ONLINE 2001 (2019).
57.
See discussion infra Section III.A.
58.
See discussion infra Section III.B.1.
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means for limiting offensive language in commercial advertising.59
Taken together, these premises establish that Congress should
deny protection for vulgar, profane, and obscene marks.
A. Offensive to the Public Generally
As a general matter, the public finds the use of vulgar,
profane, and obscene language to be highly offensive.60 The
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) defines these types
of expression as being “grossly offensive” or “patently offensive.”61
As one linguistic researcher explained: “[S]ome words are
consistently judged to be more offensive (abrasive, aggressive,
impolite, profane, upsetting, etc.) than others. Sexual terms
generally rated most offensive, followed by excretory terms which,
in turn, are typically judged more offensive than sacred terms.”62
In short, “The greater the potential of a word to offend, the likelier
the word is to be considered a swear word.”63 By definition, vulgar,
profane, and obscene language is offensive.64
To be clear, the offensiveness of such language is not merely
its use in an incorrect context (such as using fart in a formal
business setting). Rather, the use is considered to be intrinsically
inappropriate.65 Indeed, many consider use of such language to be
immoral, for morality represents a standard that defines the
intrinsic rightness or wrongness of a proposition.66 One study
59.
See discussion infra Section III.C.
60.
FÄGERSTEN, supra note 54, at 8 (ranking offensiveness of types of swear words).
61.
See Obscene, Indecent and Profane Broadcasts, FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, https://w
ww.fcc.gov/consumers/guides/obscene-indecent-and-profane-broadcasts [https://perma.cc/J
882-AT4V] (Dec. 30, 2019).
62.
FÄGERSTEN, supra note 54, at 8 (citation omitted).
63.
Id.
64.
See Katy Steinmetz, Swearing Is Scientifically Proven to Help You *%$!ing Deal,
TIME (Dec. 15, 2016, 4:46 PM), https://time.com/4602680/profanity-research-why-we-swear/
[https://perma.cc/5XXP-P5V7] (reciting cognitive scientist’s opinion that swear words
dealing with sex, bodily functions, religion, and groups of people “are built to offend, to
cause harm, to divide and to denigrate”).
65.
See Kristin Wong, The Case for Cursing, N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2017), https://www.
nytimes.com/2017/07/27/smarter-living/the-case-for-cursing.html [https://perma.cc/BT84-A
KVK] (explaining that swearing is viewed as inappropriate or taboo).
66.
See generally Moral, OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY, https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/
122086?rskey=W1HzE0&result=2&isAdvanced=false#eid [https://perma.cc/W4A6-CK6J]
(last visited Sept. 18, 2020) (defining moral as “relating to human character or behaviour
considered as good or bad; of or relating to the distinction between right and wrong, or good
and evil, in relation to the actions, desires, or character of responsible human beings;
ethical”); The Definition of Morality, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Feb. 8, 2016), https://plato
.stanford.edu/entries/morality-definition/ [https://perma.cc/PHC2-B9P8] (defining morality
as “certain codes of conduct put forward by a society or a group (such as a religion), or
accepted by an individual for her own behavior”).
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indicates that use of such language is perceived as violating the
moral foundation of purity.67 This Article, however, does not take
up the question of whether the use is immoral under any number
of moral philosophies. Instead, the Article merely points out that
use of the language is well recognized as inherently inappropriate,
and in that sense, the use is seen to be as immoral.68 This Article
refers to vulgar, profane, and obscene language as “immoral
language” only to reflect that many people consider the use of such
language to be inherently inappropriate.
Use of immoral language is, of course, common in society. It
is common in entertainment,69 in informal conversations,70 and
more recently in political speeches.71 Paradoxically, then, there are
some situations in which the use of inappropriate language is
thought to be appropriate.72 There may be circumstances that
would seem to justify the use.73 Nevertheless, the use of immoral
language remains highly offensive to many who hear or view it. 74
Indeed, the mere fact that it is used to invoke emotional emphasis
(in whatever context) indicates that the language is still
67.
See Karolina Sylwester & Matthew Purver, Twitter Language Use Reflects
Psychological Differences Between Democrats and Republicans, PLOS ONE 2 (Sept. 16,
2015), https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article/file?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0137422&type
=printable [https://perma.cc/CZ5Z-VCKY].
68.
See, e.g., Gilad Feldman et al., Frankly, We Do Give a Damn: The Relationship
Between Profanity and Honesty, 8 SOC. PSYCH. & PERSONALITY SCI. 816, 817 (2017), https://j
ournals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/1948550616681055
[https://perma.cc/XG7F-B63G]
(recognizing that profanity “violates the moral foundations of purity and the common norm
for speech” (citation omitted)).
69.
See Barry S. Sapolsky & Barbara K. Kaye, The Use of Offensive Language by Men
and Women in Prime Time Television Entertainment, 13 ATL. J. COMMC’N 292, 293 (2005).
70.
FÄGERSTEN, supra note 54, at 10 (“The influence of social context on swearing
behavior became evident when word frequency studies revealed that swear words occurred
highly frequently in the informal conversations of college students.” (citations omitted)).
71.
See, e.g., Peter Baker, The Profanity President: Trump’s Four-Letter Vocabulary,
N.Y. TIMES (May 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/19/us/politics/trump-languag
e.html [https://perma.cc/PL5Q-2LY6]; Donica Phifer, Congresswoman Rashida Tlaib Refers
to Donald Trump in Speech, Tells Crowd ‘We’ Will ‘Impeach This Motherf---er,’ NEWSWEEK
(Jan. 4, 2019, 1:28 AM), https://www.newsweek.com/congresswoman-rashida-tliab-refers-d
onald-trump-speech-tells-crowd-democrats-1279078 [https://perma.cc/CP2P-MW88]; John
Dickerson, WTF Did Biden Just Say?: A Brief History of Bad Language in Washington,
SLATE (Mar. 23, 2010, 7:43 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2010/03/wtf-did-bidenjust-say-a-brief-history-of-bad-language-in-washington.html [https://perma.cc/AYF6-5JU
B].
72.
See Wong, supra note 65.
73.
See, e.g., Feldman et al., supra note 68, at 824 (“[A] higher rate of profanity use
was associated with more honesty.”).
74.
See FÄGERSTEN, supra note 54, at 152 (“While the questionnaire participants and
interview informants consider swearing to be an acceptable practice for themselves, they
are less willing to sanction or approve of the use of swear words by others.”); supra notes
60–61.
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offensive.75 More to the point, the fact that the use may be common
in some circumstances does not imply that the law should
encourage the highly offensive language in the commercial context
of trademarks.76 Section III.B explains the reason that the
commercial context, in particular, warrants against using
immoral language. For now, it is sufficient to observe that usage
of immoral language in some contexts does not imply that the
public considers the usage appropriate in all contexts.
Why does the public find the use of immoral language to be
highly offensive? To an extent, the answer appears to be that the
language denotes meanings that are entirely inconsistent with
established norms of human decency.77 Collectively, society holds
a moral view that in a public setting, private parts of the body
should be covered and that the acts of excretion and sexual
intercourse must not occur in the public setting.78 In contrast to
these established norms, vulgar and obscene expressions call
attention to the crude portrayal of these body parts and bodily
functions.79 Vulgar and obscene expressions challenge
fundamental moral tenets that deal with methods of referring to

75.
See MONTAGU, supra note 44, at 93 (“Constant and overabundant usage of certain
common swearwords, which sparingly employed do good service, may deprive them of all
value for the purposes for which they were originally intended.”); Wong, supra note 65
(recognizing need for swear words not to be commonly used in order to preserve their
effectiveness).
76.
Cf. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 529–30 (2009) (“[T]he
pervasiveness of foul language, and the coarsening of public entertainment in other media
such as cable, justify more stringent regulation of broadcast programs . . . .”).
77.
See Vulgar, supra note 45 (defining vulgar to mean “lacking in cultivation” and
“profanely indecent”); Profane, supra note 48 (defining profane to mean “serving to debase
or defile what is holy”); Obscene, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/di
ctionary/obscene [https://perma.cc/CW4J-27XT] (last visited Sept. 18, 2020) (defining
obscene to mean “abhorrent to morality or virtue”); MONTAGU, supra note 44, at 100 (“In
every case [of using swear words] there is an emotional association of some sort. This
emotional association is generally an intrinsic part of the meaning of the word itself or else
is extrinsically given to it either directly or by implication, as in negative swearing.”).
78.
See, e.g., State v. Vars, 237 P.3d 378, 381 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010) (“Washington
common law has defined [open and obscene exposure] as ‘a lascivious exhibition of those
private parts of the person which instinctive modesty, human decency, or common propriety
require shall be customarily kept covered in the presence of others.’” (quoting State v.
Galbreath, 419 P.2d 800, 803 (Wash. 1966))); Ardery v. State, 56 Ind. 328, 329–30 (1877)
(“And it historically appears that the first most palpable piece of indecency in a human
being was the public exposure of his or her, as now commonly called, privates . . . .”).
79.
See generally Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 25 (1973) (describing material that
states could prohibit as obscenity to include, as an example, “[p]atently offensive
representations or descriptions of masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibition
of the genitals”).
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and portraying body parts and bodily functions.80 Similarly,
profanity represents a desecration of religious ideals that
segments of the public hold sacred.81 Names of holy figures in
particular are often the subject of profane expressions.82 To
profane those names is to demonstrate a disrespect and
irreverence for deeply held moral beliefs. Therefore, the use of
immoral language challenges fundamental moral beliefs and
norms of society.
To be clear, though, the reason that the public finds the use
of this language to be inappropriate is not merely because the
meaning suggests a viewpoint that contravenes established moral
norms. Use of the language is inappropriate because of its crude
and base portrayal of the meanings.83 Consider the vulgar
reference to the idea of sexual intercourse—i.e., the F-word. The
vulgar word portrays the concept of sex in a crude and base
manner. The concept of sex is not considered inappropriate, but its
crude and base portrayal is. Now suppose that a person were to
state the following argument: “rape should be permissible.”
Although the argument forwards a viewpoint that most would
consider to be immoral, the language used to convey that
argument is not crude or base. Stated another way, the idea that
the language conveys is offensive, but the language itself is not.
Hence, the offensiveness of immoral language does not merely
reflect disagreement with an immoral idea, but rather, it stems
from the manner in which the idea’s expression occurs—i.e., in a
manner that is crude, coarse, and base.
This premise for denying trademark protection—that the
immoral language is highly offensive—is bolstered by the fact that
those who use immoral language usually do so for the sole purpose
of evoking emotion.84 Precisely because many members of the
public take offense at the crudeness of immoral language do

80.
See Fox Television Stations, 556 U.S. at 517 (“As the Commission said with regard
to expletive use of the F-Word, ‘the word’s power to insult and offend derives from its sexual
meaning.’”); id. at 509 (defining F-word as a vulgar term meaning to copulate).
81.
See MONTAGU, supra note 44, at 100–02.
82.
See id.
83.
Cf. Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2309 (2019) (Sotomayor, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (arguing that offensiveness that results from scandalous marks
“could result from the views expressed, but it could also result from the way in which those
views are expressed: using a manner of expression that is ‘shocking to [one’s] sense
of . . . decency,’ or ‘extremely offensive to the sense . . . of propriety’” (citation omitted)).
84.
See MONTAGU, supra note 44, at 100.
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speakers employ that language.85 Indeed, those speakers usually
do not intend to refer specifically to the concepts that immoral
language represents.86 Rather, they usually intend to invoke only
the offensiveness that follows from the crude portrayal of those
concepts.87 The offensiveness evokes emotion, which serves to
emphasize the idea expressed. Even where the speaker does not
intend to convey a critical meaning, the immoral language usually
involves an attempt to invoke an offensive connotation that
emphasizes the idea. For instance, consider the phrase F—ING
GOOD CHICKEN! as a mark for a restaurant that serves chicken.
Presumably, the speaker intends neither to communicate
anything about the actual meaning of the F-word (sexual
intercourse) nor anything critical of chickens. Instead, the speaker
intends to communicate that the chicken tastes very good. The Fword serves to grab the attention of readers owing to its inherent
offensiveness. It adds offensive emotive force to the message.88
This matters because it suggests that speakers employ vulgar,
profane, and obscene expression for the specific purpose of
invoking its offensive characteristic. Not only is the use of immoral
language highly offensive to many in the public, its speakers
intend it to be so.
Thus, Congress should deny trademark protection for
immoral language because the public finds that language to be
highly offensive. Users of immoral language purposefully employ
it to evoke its offensive connotation. In their exposure to
trademarks, members of the public should not be subject to
purposefully offensive language.
B. Commercial Context
There are many contexts that the law has reserved for using
vulgar, profane, and even obscene language. Political gatherings,89

85.
See Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2311 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (“The most obvious ways—indeed, perhaps the only conceivable ways—in which a
trademark can be expressed in a shocking or offensive manner are when the speaker
employs obscenity, vulgarity, or profanity.”).
86.
See MONTAGU, supra note 44, at 100; Teresa Elizabeth Stone et al., Back to Swear
One: A Review of English Language Literature on Swearing and Cursing in Western Health
Settings, 25 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 65, 66 (2015) (“Swearwords are used primarily
in a connotative way, referring to the emotional nuances commonly associated with
swearing, whereas denotation refers to more literal meaning.” (citation omitted)).
87.
See MONTAGU, supra note 44, at 93.
88.
See id. at 100 (discussing “polite swearing”).
89.
See sources cited supra note 71.
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sporting events,90 television,91 and even the public square are only
a few of the many contexts that allow for their use.92 So, for those
who believe that morally offensive terminology is necessary to
communicate emotive force, the law permits such language in
certain situations.
The forum of commercial advertising—and in particular
trademarks—should not be one of those situations. Two reasons
support this conclusion. First, the public prefers that businesses
use
non-offensive
methods
of
expressing
commercial
information.93 Second, use of such language as trademarks hinders
commercial activity.94 The Sections below discuss these two
reasons.
1. Offensive Methods of Communication. As discussed in
Section III.A, much of the public prefers not to encounter offensive
language. That preference matters a lot in the commercial realm.
Within the commercial realm, the government may determine
permissible methods for businesses to present their commercial
advertising.95 Given that the purpose of commercial advertising is
to attract consumers, the public expects the advertising to employ
methods of advertising that are attractive, or at least nonoffensive.96 The public expects commercial advertisers to use
means that do not offend the public sense of morality. Therefore,
90.
See Lindsay H. Jones, Profanities Still Flying in NFL Games Despite Flags, USA
TODAY: SPORTS (Oct. 11, 2014, 7:27 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nfl/2014/
10/11/profanity-language-penalties-officials/17120379/ [https://perma.cc/8RH5-3TDC]. But
see MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 36A (2020), https://malegislature.gov/Laws/GeneralLaws/P
artIV/TitleI/Chapter272/Section36A [https://perma.cc/BBV8-EVB2] (“Whoever, having
arrived at the age of sixteen years, directs any profane, obscene or impure language or
slanderous statement at a participant or an official in a sporting event, shall be punished
by a fine of not more than fifty dollars.”).
91.
See Sapolsky & Kaye, supra note 69, at 292–301.
92.
E.g., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 569–70, 585–86 (2002) (enjoining
enforcement of a statute prohibiting sexually oriented material on the internet and
remanding); ACLU v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 181, 206–07 (3d Cir. 2008) (striking down the
statute as unconstitutional on remand).
93.
See infra Section III.B.1.
94.
See infra Section III.B.2.
95.
E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B) (regulating “commercial advertising” to avoid
misrepresentations of goods).
96.
This expectation is not the same as an expectation that ideas within
advertisements be non-offensive or, in the words of Justice Alito, that trademarks consist
only of “happy-talk” expression. See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1765 (2017) (plurality
opinion). As discussed in Section III.B.1 below, a requirement that methods of
communication be non-offensive is constitutionally distinct from a requirement that the
ideas within the advertising be non-offensive. See discussion infra Section III.B.1. The
latter requirement would be unconstitutionally viewpoint discriminatory; the former would
not.
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to meet that expectation, the law should not encourage highly
offensive language in commercial advertising.
Other contexts support the argument that the law should
support the public’s preference for non-offensive methods of
communicating commercial advertising. One example is
computer-automated phone calls. Many members of the public
prefer not to be bothered by a computer calling their cell phones
and reciting commercial advertisements.97 Congress has therefore
passed a law that prevents placing automated phone calls which
advertise unsolicited commercial messages (or in other words, that
engage in robocalling).98 That law carries a penalty of up to
$1 million for a single violation, and the FCC is actively enforcing
it.99 Another example is unsolicited commercial and pornographic
e-mail, which most members of the public prefer not to receive.
Congress enacted the CAN-SPAM Act, which imposes penalties of
up to $43,280 per e-mail for sending unsolicited commercial or
pornography e-mail (under certain conditions).100 In short, these
modes of presenting commercial advertisements are offensive to
members of the public, so Congress has acted to prevent them.
Just as the public prefers not to receive robocalls and spam email, the public prefers not to receive advertisements through the
method of highly offensive, immoral language. Like robocalls and
spam e-mail, immoral language reflects a mode of communication
that is independent of the specific message within the
advertisement. When used merely to evoke emotional force—
which is usually the case—immoral language is not employed to
convey a specific viewpoint.101 In that situation, the immoral
language is used to gain attention.102 The mode is crude and base,
which effectuates offense, emotion, and attention. The public,
understandably, prefers not to receive this mode of expression. As
97.
See Stop Unwanted Robocalls and Texts, FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, https://www.fc
c.gov/consumers/guides/stop-unwanted-robocalls-and-texts [https://perma.cc/YYD7-VGSX]
(July 9, 2020) (“Unwanted calls[—]including illegal and spoofed robocalls[⏤]are the FCC’s
top consumer complaint and our top consumer protection priority.”).
98.
47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(B)–(C).
99.
Id. § 227(b)(1)(B)–(C), (5)(A); see also The FCC’s Push to Combat Robocalls &
Spoofing, FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, https://www.fcc.gov/spoofed-robocalls [https://perma.cc/
FEG6-CC98] (last visited Aug. 19, 2020).
100.
15 U.S.C. § 7706; CAN-SPAM Act: A Compliance Guide for Business, FED. TRADE
COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/can-spam-act-complianc
e-guide-business [https://perma.cc/5MQN-KB4R] (Jan. 1, 2020); see also Tracy McVeigh,
Porn Spammers Jailed for Five Years, GUARDIAN (Oct. 14, 2007, 6:39 PM), https://www.theg
uardian.com/technology/2007/oct/14/internet.crime [https://perma.cc/T8E3-7A8L].
101.
See MONTAGU, supra note 44, at 93, 100.
102.
See id.
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discussed below in Section III.C, denying a trademark is an
effective means of limiting this mode in commercial advertising.
Of course, bars to robocalls and spam e-mail are
distinguishable on the grounds that they do not target the content
of speech. The Supreme Court has recently held that robocall
regulations that target messages in speech violate the First
Amendment.103 However, this Section is not discussing the speech
implications of a bar to immoral language. Part IV engages that
discussion, and as discussed in Section IV.B, a bar to immoral
language does not target any message or idea within speech. Here,
I note merely that the offensiveness of being bothered by robocalls
and spam e-mail illustrates limitations on acceptable modes of
communication in advertising. Immoral language involves the
same sort of offensiveness.
2. Disruption to Commerce. Marks that contain immoral
language are likely to disrupt the commercial marketplace. Their
intrinsic offensiveness creates an atmosphere that is uninviting.
As time continues without any bar to immoral language,
businesses are likely to become more confident that immoral
language is worthy of investment as a brand that grabs the
attention of consumers. And trademarks are everywhere, so
encounters with offensive marks would not be avoidable.104 Even
if a person turns away from a mark, the trademark has already
registered in the mind. The offense occurs. Consumers, in turn,
feel less comfortable freely observing brands in the commercial
marketplace.
In view of the risk of being offended, some consumers may
severely limit their exposure to trademarks, perhaps reducing
their participation in the commercial marketplace wherever
possible. Some may continue to view offensive marks but alter
consumption choices. Some may not let offensive marks affect
their consumption choices at all, perhaps being only mildly
annoyed. And some may even appreciate the offensive language as
103.
The recent case of Barr v. Am. Ass’n of Pol. Consultants, Inc., No. 19-631, slip op.
at 25 (U.S. July 6, 2020), is consistent with this conclusion. In Barr, the Supreme Court
held that a provision of the federal robocall statute violated the First Amendment—
specifically, the provision that exempted debt collection calls on behalf of the United States.
See id. The Court explained that the law “favored debt-collection speech over [other]
political speech,” so it was unconstitutional. Id. The proposal in this Article does not target
the specific ideas or messages in speech, but instead, only the mode of expressing the
message. See discussion infra Section IV.B.3 (explaining the distinction between targeting
ideas and modes of expression).
104.
See Ned Snow, Denying Trademark for Scandalous Speech, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
2331, 2362 (2018) [hereinafter Denying Trademark] (noting the ubiquity of trademarks).
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a form of humor or entertainment. Of these various groups, those
who act on their offense (by not participating or altering
consumption choices) will negatively affect commercial activity.105
Simply put, transactions that would have occurred will not. Of
course, those who appreciate offensive marks might actually
increase economic activity. Yet it seems unlikely that those
consumers would cause a net gain for commercial activity in view
of those consumers who decrease their activity because of their
offense. In short, marks that contain offensive language would
seem to diminish the robustness of commercial activity.106 The
offense has occurred, so commerce will not.
It is true that if consumers refuse to engage in commercial
transactions because of offensive language, mark owners might
change their marks, or alternatively, websites and stores might
refuse to carry those goods with the offensive marks. Arguably the
laissez-faire marketplace will resolve the problem of immoral
language in marks.107 But this argument fails to recognize the
practical reality that a sufficient number of consumers might (and
likely will) consume products with marks containing immoral
language. Even if those consumers comprise a minority of the
public, the minority is likely sufficient to keep the mark owner in
business. That being the case, consumers who find the language
offensive will continue to encounter such marks without means for
preventing exposure. Although they might not purchase the good
or frequent the store, they will still see, hear, and read the
advertisements potentially anywhere. The specific commercial
experience becomes an unpleasant one. And as more businesses
invest in immoral-language marks, offensive experiences will
become a regular occurrence. Uninviting and offensive, the
commercial marketplace will suffer.
C. Trademark Law as a Deterrent
To the extent that the law can prevent immoral language in
trademarks, the law will do much to prevent immoral language in

105.
See Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2307 (2019) (Breyer, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (“These attention-grabbing words, though financially valuable to
some businesses that seek to attract interest in their products, threaten to distract
consumers and disrupt commerce.”).
106.
See id. (“[Vulgar marks] may lead to the creation of public spaces that many will
find repellant, perhaps on occasion creating the risk of verbal altercations or even physical
confrontations.”).
107.
See Denying Trademark, supra note 104, at 2367.
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commercial advertising.108 The question that follows is whether
denying trademark registration for immoral language will
actually prevent people from using them as trademarks. The
answer appears to be yes. Businesses have an incentive to use only
those marks that can be registered for federal trademark
protection.109 Registration ensures that other businesses will not
pass themselves off as the mark owner.110 It facilitates effective
brand marketing, leading to reputational value for the mark
owner. Yet without trademark protection, a seller risks losing
business to competitors who might copy the seller’s brand name.
Therefore, businesses have a strong financial incentive to choose
a mark for their goods or services that is eligible for trademark
registration. Accordingly, Congress should deny registration for
marks containing immoral language to place economic pressure on
businesses not to use those marks.
This premise that denying trademark would deter immoral
language draws strength from both the purposes and doctrines of
trademark law. That strength, however, is dependent on the
timeliness of Congress’s action. Both these points are discussed in
the two Sections below.
1. Purposes and Doctrines of Trademark Law. The purposes
that underlie trademark law support the purpose of denying
protection for vulgar, profane, and obscene language. The general
purpose of trademark law is to benefit consumers, and to further
this general purpose, trademark law fulfills several specific
purposes.111 First, it protects consumers from confusion about the
source of a product. By providing a mark owner an exclusive mark,
trademark enables consumers to easily and accurately identify a
product’s brand.112 Second, it protects consumers from deceptive
108.
In order to qualify for federal trademark protection, a trademark must be placed
on the good or displayed in the advertising or sale of a service. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051, 1127.
109.
See generally USPTO, U.S. DEP’T OF COM., PROTECTING YOUR TRADEMARK:
ENHANCING YOUR RIGHTS THROUGH FEDERAL REGISTRATION 11–12 (2020), https://w
ww.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/BasicFacts.pdf [https://perma.cc/H6QU-EHH9]
(explaining benefits of registering a trademark).
110.
See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (imposing liability on parties who infringe a
registered mark).
111.
See generally Ned Snow, Free Speech & Disparaging Trademarks, 57 B.C. L. REV.
1639, 1668–70 (2016) [hereinafter Free Speech] (reciting various purposes of trademark
law).
112.
See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 782 n.15 (1992) (Stevens,
J., concurring) (quoting legislative history that articulates one purpose of trademark to be
“protect[ing] the public so it may be confident that, in purchasing a product bearing a
particular trade-mark which it favorably knows, it will get the product which it asks for
and wants to get”).
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advertising. Marks that deceive consumers about characteristics
of the product are denied protection.113 Third, it facilitates an
incentive for businesses to offer products that consumers value.
The trademark provides a means for businesses to gain a
reputation as sponsors of a product. That reputation incentivizes
businesses to offer quality products.114
Consistent with these purposes of trademark law, denying
protection for immoral language would also benefit consumers.
Just as trademark law protects consumers from confusion over a
product’s source and from deception about characteristics of goods,
trademark law can protect consumers from highly offensive modes
of advertising. For many consumers, protection from offensive
language is at least as beneficial as protection from confusion or
deception.115 Furthermore, incentivizing businesses to use nonoffensive modes of expression (by denying protection for immoral
language) is analogous to incentivizing businesses to offer quality
products to consumers: both incentives promote consumer
satisfaction. Hence, denying protection for immoral language is
consistent with the specific purposes of trademark law that
ultimately benefit consumers.
Specific provisions of the Lanham Act (the Act) further
support denying protection for immoral language. The Lanham
Act already denies trademark registration for certain categories of
content on moral grounds. The Act denies protection for portrayals
of a deceased president while the spouse is alive (without his or
her consent).116 The reason for this denial would seem to be that
the public considers it inappropriate to commercialize a deceased
president while his or her spouse is still living. The president’s
memory should not be commercialized, out of respect for the widow
or widower.117 This is a moral reason. Similarly, the Act prevents
113.
See Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1839, 1844 (2007) (“By preserving the integrity of these symbols, trademark
law benefits consumers . . . by protecting them from being deceived into buying products
they do not want . . . .”).
114.
See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163–64 (1995)
(“[Trademark] law helps assure a producer that it (and not an imitating competitor) will
reap the financial, reputation-related rewards associated with a desirable product.”).
115.
See Denying Trademark, supra note 104, at 2357, 2359, 2361.
116.
15 U.S.C. § 1052(c).
117.
See Nicole Kinsley, The Federal Trademark Statute Assumes Hillary Can’t Win,
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. (July 21, 2016), https://www.trademarkandcopyrightlawblog.c
om/2016/07/the-federal-trademark-statute-assumes-hillary-cant-win/ [https://perma.cc/D6
6T-8NC4]. Some might argue that the reason is to prevent consumers from being misled
into believing that the deceased president had endorsed the good during his or her life. That
reason, however, would not explain why the bar applies only during the life of the widow or
widower.
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registration of an insignia of the United States, any state, or any
foreign nation.118 One court has noted the reason for this bar:
government insignia “ought to be kept solely to signify the
government and not to be sullied or debased by use as symbols of
business and trade.”119 The use of government insignia as a
trademark would sully or debase that insignia, which apparently
should not be done.120 Here, again, is another moral reason.121
Thus, the deceased-presidents bar and the government-insignia
bar are both morally based bars to trademark protection. Bars to
vulgar, profane, and obscene marks would not be the first, or the
only, morally based bars.
2. Timeliness of the Bars. The effectiveness of the law at
limiting immoral language in trademarks will decrease as
Congress procrastinates the enactment of this proposal. As
discussed in Part IV below, the Supreme Court in 2019 struck
down a century-old statutory provision that barred registration of
marks that were “scandalous” or “immoral.”122 Those terms
allowed the government to deny protection not only to the immoral
language but also to specific ideas that the government considered
to be immoral.123 The terms were thus held to be
unconstitutional.124 Importantly, though, several members of the
Court wrote separately to observe that Congress could bar
protection for marks that are vulgar, profane, or obscene.125 The
118.
15 U.S.C. § 1052(b).
119.
Renna v. County of Union, 88 F. Supp. 3d 310, 318 n.9 (D.N.J. 2014).
120.
See id.
121.
Some might argue that this reason for this bar is to protect people from being
confused over whether the government endorses the good or service. That is possible,
although not the view articulated by the Renna court quoted above. Furthermore, if that
were the reason, the bar would have precluded protection only for parties who are not the
government organization corresponding to the government insignia. But that is not so: the
bar applies to government organizations as well. E.g., In re City of Houston, 731 F.3d 1326,
1331 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (denying trademark protection for a city’s own government symbol);
see also Rebecca Tushnet, The First Amendment Walks into a Bar: Trademark Registration
and Free Speech, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 381, 409 n.106 (2016) (questioning deceptiveness
as a reason for the government insignia bar given that the bar prohibits governments from
registering their own insignia).
122.
See Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2302 (2019); sources cited supra note 3.
123.
Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2299–2301.
124.
Id. at 2302.
125.
See id. at 2303 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(“[R]efusing registration to obscene, vulgar, or profane marks does not offend the First
Amendment.”); id. (Alito, J., concurring) (“Our decision does not prevent Congress from
adopting a more carefully focused statute that precludes the registration of marks
containing vulgar terms that play no real part in the expression of ideas.”); id. at 2306
(Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[I]t is hard to see how a statute
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majority opinion explicitly noted that its holding did not reach
such modes of expression.126 Hence, the Court sent a clear signal
to Congress that it could—and perhaps should—bar protection for
vulgar, profane, and obscene marks.
Given the Court’s signal, one would expect Congress to
quickly enact trademark bars for vulgar, profane, and obscene
language. Indeed, for a century, Congress blocked such immoral
language under the old “immoral” and “scandalous” bars, never
hinting that it would remove those bars.127 So when the Court
struck down those bars, one would have expected Congress to
immediately fix the seeming technicality. One would have
expected Congress to replace the old unconstitutional terms with
the freshly endorsed constitutional terms: vulgar, profane, and
obscene. But two years have passed since Brunetti and Congress
has done nothing. Has Congress changed its mind about immoral
language in trademarks? As time continues to pass, the question
becomes more pressing. Congress’s continued silence after the
Court’s explicit invitation to replace the old bars suggests that
Congress no longer values non-offensive modes of expressing
commercial information. Or perhaps it suggests that Congress no
longer has a problem with immoral language.
Whatever the reason that Congress delays, the passing of
time creates an expectation on the part of businesses that use of
immoral language is permissible for trademark registration.
Expectations become settled, so businesses gain confidence to
invest in marks containing immoral language. With the passage of
time, businesses become confident that such marks are here to
stay. And those marks will only continue to grab the attention of
consumers. They are, therefore, likely to become more common as
Congress postpones any action. Crude portrayals of concepts that
contravene fundamental moral norms will become a part of the
commercial marketplace. Unless Congress acts soon, civilized
discourse will quickly erode.

prohibiting the registration of only highly vulgar or obscene words discriminates based on
‘viewpoint.’”); id. at 2318 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“With
‘scandalous’ narrowed to reach only obscene, profane, and vulgar content, the provision
would not be overly broad.”).
126.
See id. at 2301–02, 2302 n.* (majority opinion).
127.
See Trademark Act of 1905, Pub. L. No. 84, § 5(a), 33 Stat. 724, 725 (prohibiting
trademark registration for scandalous or immoral matter), repealed by 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a).
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IV.CONSTITUTION
The proposal that Congress enact bars to vulgar, profane, and
obscene marks (VPO bars) raises an obvious question: Would the
VPO bars violate the First Amendment?128 This question calls for
both a doctrinal and theoretical discussion. The doctrinal
discussion first considers whether denying trademark registration
constitutes an act of speech suppression.129 Concluding that the
denial is indeed an act of suppression, the discussion considers
whether an exceptional speech doctrine could justify the VPO bars.
Specifically, does the context of trademark registration suggest
the application of the limited public forum doctrine?130 Section
IV.A takes up these two issues. Section IV.B focuses on the single
issue of whether the VPO bars would be viewpoint-neutral—a
critical requirement in most First Amendment contexts.
Viewpoint neutrality merits close attention in light of the two
recent Supreme Court cases mentioned above—Matal v. Tam131
and Iancu v. Brunetti.132 Section IV.B analyzes those cases. Section
IV.C then observes recent remarks made by Justices relating to
the constitutionality of the VPO bars, specifically. Finally, this
Part engages a theoretical discussion in Section IV.D, considering
whether the VPO bars would be consistent with the theory that
underlies free speech.
A. Doctrinal Framework
Any government restriction that discriminates on the content
of speech presumptively represents Congress “abridging the
freedom of speech,” in direct violation of the First Amendment.133
The doctrine is simple: the government “has no power to restrict
expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or
its content.”134 Thus, the question here is whether Congress is
128.
Professor Gary Myers has examined this question as well. See Gary Myers, It's
Scandalous! – Limiting Profane Trademark Registrations after Tam and Brunetti, 27 J.
INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 10–19 (2019). He has concluded that a statutory bar to vulgar, profane,
and obscene marks would not violate the First Amendment. Id. at 19–20.
129.
See discussion infra Section IV.A.1.
130.
See discussion infra Section IV.A.2.
131.
137 S. Ct. 1744, 1757–58 (2017).
132.
139 S. Ct. at 2299–2302 (2019).
133.
U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also cases cited infra note 134.
134.
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015) (quoting Police Dep’t of Chi.
v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972)); see also Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 790–
91 (2011); Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. N.Y. State
Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 118 (1991) (“If there is a bedrock principle underlying the
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restricting expression because of its message, ideas, subject, or
content when Congress denies trademark registration for vulgar,
profane, or obscene marks.
1. Act of Abridgment. This question raises a preliminary
issue that the recent Court cases appear to have settled—i.e.,
whether denying trademark registration constitutes an act of
abridgement. By denying registration, the government does not
preclude anyone from using any sort of expression as a mark.135
That is, in the absence of registration, a seller who uses a mark to
represent her products can continue to do so; she merely cannot
prevent someone else from duplicating the same mark. The seller
is in no way prohibited from using the mark. Although the effect
of denying registration may be to deprive the seller of the economic
benefit that follows from trademark protection, trademark law
does not directly preclude the seller from using any sort of
expression as a mark. On this basis, it is arguable that denying
registration does not abridge any speech. The speech can still
occur.
For several decades, appellate courts employed this reasoning
to hold that content-based restrictions on trademark registration
did not raise any speech issue.136 Without an abridgment, any sort
of discrimination would not matter. But in the two recent cases of
Iancu v. Brunetti137 and Matal v. Tam,138 the Court’s holdings
imply otherwise. In both cases, the Court struck down contentbased bars to trademark registration on First Amendment
grounds (which will be discussed in greater detail below in Section
First Amendment, it is that the Government may not prohibit the expression of an idea
simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.” (quoting United
States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 319 (1990))).
135.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (setting forth requirements for trademark registration);
Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2303 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(“Whether such marks can be registered does not affect the extent to which their owners
may use them in commerce to identify goods. No speech is being restricted; no one is being
punished.”).
136.
See In re Boulevard Ent., Inc., 334 F.3d 1336, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (following
precedent that “rejected First Amendment challenges to refusals to register marks under
[S]ection 1052(a), holding that the refusal to register a mark does not proscribe any conduct
or suppress any form of expression because it does not affect the applicant’s right to use the
mark in question”), abrogated by Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2302; In re Mavety Media Grp. Ltd.,
33 F.3d 1367, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding that the scandalous and immoral bars do not
abridge a trademark applicant’s speech rights on the grounds that “[n]o conduct is
proscribed, and no tangible form of expression is suppressed”), abrogated by Brunetti, 139
S. Ct. at 2302; In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 484 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (employing the same
reasoning as the court in Mavety Media Grp.), abrogated by Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2302.
137.
139 S. Ct. at 2302.
138.
137 S. Ct. 1744, 1765 (2017).
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IV.B). Although in neither case did the Court ever explicitly state
that the bars served to suppress or abridge the speech of mark
owners, the Court’s holdings in both cases—that the bars violated
the First Amendment—require that conclusion. How else could
the bars have violated the First Amendment other than through
an act of speech suppression? Hence, the issue is settled: content
bars to trademark registration have an effect on speech sufficient
to trigger First Amendment interests.
From a practical standpoint, this implied holding of Brunetti
and Tam makes sense. Simply put, denying the economic benefit
of trademark rights chills the exercise of speech. Potential mark
owners avoid speaking marks that would not be eligible for those
rights. Indeed, the very purpose of denying registration for
immoral language—to prevent mark owners from using those
sorts of marks—necessarily implies that the government is
attempting to restrict speech based on content. A speech
abridgment is definitely occurring.
2. Justifications for Content Restrictions. The blanket
statement that Congress “has no power to restrict expression
because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content”
is not without exception.139 Viewed under a standard of “strict
scrutiny,” government restrictions of speech content are
permissible if narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government
interest,140 such as “protecting the physical and psychological wellbeing of minors”141 or protecting national security.142 Under this
standard, however, the VPO bars would not likely pass
constitutional muster. The government’s interest in ensuring that
consumers are not offended by immoral language does not seem
compelling. There is no demonstrable harm to consumers—just
the inconvenience of avoiding certain marks.143
Perhaps, though, the bars serve a compelling government
interest because they protect the psychological well-being of
139.
See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2226.
140.
Id. at 2226–27.
141.
See Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (“We have
recognized that there is a compelling interest in protecting the physical and psychological
well-being of minors.”).
142.
See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307–08 (1981).
143.
Cf. Virgin Enters. Ltd. v. Nawab, 335 F.3d 141, 147 (2d Cir. 2003) (“The purpose
for which the trademark law accords merchants the exclusive right to the use of a name or
symbol in their area or commerce is identification, so that the merchants can establish
goodwill for their goods based on past satisfactory performance, and the consuming public
can rely on a mark as a guarantee that the goods or services so marked come from the
merchant who has been found to be satisfactory in the past.”).

58 HOUS. L. REV. 401 (2020)

2020]

IMMORAL TRADEMARKS

427

children. Trademarks are basically everywhere,144 and at least
with respect to obscene marks that are pornographic in nature,
courts,145 legal scholars,146 and social scientists147 agree that
pornographic material causes serious harms to the psychological
wellness of children. Yet even assuming a compelling interest, the
VPO bars would not appear narrowly tailored to serve that
interest.148 The law could still provide protection for marks
containing immoral language by limiting the protection to certain
contexts that children do not usually frequent (e.g., adult-media
stores and websites). Or alternatively, the law could deny
protection only for the specific contexts where children are likely
to view marks (e.g., children’s toys). Under strict scrutiny, the
broad reach of the VPO bars does not seem justifiable.
That the VPO bars cannot satisfy the strict-scrutiny standard
does not imply their unconstitutionality. There are many contentbased restrictions in trademark law that are likely not justified
under the strict-scrutiny standard.149 Yet those other contentbased restrictions must be constitutional if the trademark system
144.
See Denying Trademark, supra note 104, at 2362.
145.
See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748–51 (1978) (upholding
regulation of constitutionally protected indecent speech over broadcast airwaves on
grounds that “a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all Americans” and, moreover,
“broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children”).
146.
See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986 DUKE L.J.
589, 601–02 (“All of these factors support the conclusion that pornography is a significant
social problem—producing serious harm, mostly to women—and that substantial benefits
would result if the pornography industry were regulated.”).
147.
See, e.g., Michael Flood, The Harms of Pornography Exposure Among Children
and Young People, 18 CHILD ABUSE REV. 384, 391–93 (2009); Kirk Doran & Joseph Price,
Pornography and Marriage, 35 J. FAM. & ECON. ISSUES 489, 495–96 (2014) (finding that
the use of pornographic material is associated with less marital satisfaction and
summarizing other research on pornography’s effect on marriages and families); Destin N.
Stewart & Dawn M. Szymanski, Young Adult Women’s Reports of Their Male Romantic
Partner’s Pornography Use as a Correlate of Their Self-Esteem, Relationship Quality, and
Sexual Satisfaction, 67 SEX ROLES 257, 257 (2012) (“Results [of the survey] revealed
women’s reports of their male partner’s frequency of pornography use were negatively
associated with their relationship quality. More perceptions of problematic use of
pornography was negatively correlated with self-esteem, relationship quality, and sexual
satisfaction.”); Valerie Voon et al., Neural Correlates of Sexual Cue Reactivity in Individuals
with and Without Compulsive Sexual Behaviours, PLOS ONE (July 11, 2014), https://journal
s.plos.org/plosone/article/file?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0102419&type=printable [https://pe
rma.cc/5KTQ-KTAX] (conducting empirical study demonstrating that brain activity of
pornography users is akin to drug addicts).
148.
Perhaps, though, such a bar would be narrowly tailored. Professor Gary Myers
has compared the VPO bars to indecent-speech regulation by the FCC, which the Court has
held to be constitutional in FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726 (1978). See Myers, supra note 128,
at 18.
149.
E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (listing criteria for trademark registration that are based
on the content of a mark).
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is to work.150 Consider the bars to registering marks that are
deceptive,151 that are descriptive of goods,152 that are so similar to
an existing mark that they are likely to cause confusion or
mistakes among consumers,153 or that falsely suggest a connection
with persons.154 These content-based bars facilitate truthful
advertising and efficiency in the commercial marketplace.155
Trademark could not fulfill its purposes without them.
Unsurprisingly, then, some members of the Court have explicitly
recognized that some content-based criteria in trademark law
must be constitutional.156 Nevertheless, the Court has not yet
delineated the proper test for evaluating whether content-based
restrictions in the trademark context are permissible under the
First Amendment.157 In short, content-based restrictions must be
permissible in trademark law; the Court simply has not explained
the correct analytical framework that would justify the
restrictions.
Although the Court has not definitively set forth the proper
framework, Justices Alito, Sotomayor, and Breyer have suggested
that the appropriate framework might be the limited-public-forum

150.
See Free Speech, supra note 111, at 1647–61 (arguing that restrictions in
trademark law must fall within an exception that allows for content discrimination).
151.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a), invalidated in part by Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294
(2019); Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017).
152.
15 U.S.C. § 1052(e). The descriptive bar applies only if the mark has not become
distinctive. See id. § 1052(f).
153.
Id. § 1052(d).
154.
Id. § 1052(a), invalidated in part by Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2294; Tam, 137 S. Ct.
at 1744.
155.
See generally William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of
Trademark Law, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 267, 267, 276–77 (1988) (“The overall conclusion is
that trademark law . . . can best be explained on the hypothesis that the law is trying to
promote economic efficiency.”).
156.
See Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2306 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (“[R]egulations governing trademark registration ‘inevitably involve content
discrimination.’” (quoting Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2234–35 (2015) (Breyer,
J., concurring))); Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1768 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring
in judgment) (recognizing that it is well settled that certain content-based criteria for
trademark registration is constitutional).
157.
See Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2298–99 (recognizing that the Tam Court could not
agree on whether a bar in the Lanham Act constitutes “a condition on a government benefit
or a simple restriction on speech,” such that the Court could not reach consensus on “the
overall framework for deciding the case,” and deciding Brunetti on the same grounds as
Tam).
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doctrine.158 They appear correct.159 The limited-public-forum
doctrine applies when evaluating government restrictions on
speech that occurs within a forum that the government has
created to facilitate private speech for certain purposes.160 In that
context, content discrimination is permissible if the restrictions
are viewpoint-neutral and “reasonable in light of the purpose
served by the forum.”161 For example, a public library might
designate a room for discussing the works of Mark Twain at a
particular time. The room is a government forum intended to
facilitate private speech. The content restriction—only speech
about Mark Twain—serves a purpose of the library—to provide
educational opportunities about authors—and it is viewpointneutral—any opinion about Mark Twain is welcome. Importantly,
the limited-public-forum doctrine is not limited only to physical
fora. The doctrine may apply to metaphysical fora, or in other
words, it may apply where the government has expended benefits
or resources that further private speech.162 For example, the Court
has applied this doctrine when it has evaluated school funding for
a student publication that is conditioned on content-based
restrictions,163 and a school’s provision of resources for a student
organization that is conditioned on content-based restrictions.164
Thus, the limited-public-forum doctrine allows for content-based
restrictions on private speech where the government has expended
resources to facilitate the speech, insofar as the restrictions are
viewpoint-neutral and serve a purpose for expending the
resources.

158.
See id. at 2305 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“But one
can find some vague resemblance between trademark registration and what this Court
refers to as a ‘limited public forum’ created by the government for private speech.”); id. at
2316 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]he Court has treated
such initiatives as a limited public (or nonpublic) forum.”); Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1763
(plurality opinion) (“Potentially more analogous [to speech restrictions in the Lanham Act]
are cases in which a unit of government creates a limited public forum for private speech.”).
159.
See Denying Trademark, supra note 104, at 2364–65 (arguing that trademark
restrictions fall within the doctrine of limited public forum).
160.
See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995)
(“The necessities of confining a forum to the limited and legitimate purposes for which it
was created may justify the State in reserving it for certain groups or for the discussion of
certain topics.”).
161.
See id. (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788,
806 (1985)).
162.
See id. at 830.
163.
See id. at 829–31.
164.
See Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 672–73 (2010).
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This doctrine appears applicable to the context of trademark
registration.165 Through the registration process, the government
extends enforceable property rights to persons who register their
marks.166 The provision of enforceable rights is intended to
facilitate private speech in the form of trademarks.167
Furthermore, the Court has noted that where the government “is
dangling the carrot of subsidy, not wielding the stick of
prohibition,” the restriction is more likely to be viewed within the
framework of a limited public forum.168 This point is, of course,
relevant because trademark registration represents a government
reward that only indirectly influences speech—not a criminal or
financial punishment. Thus, the limited-public-forum doctrine
appears the correct framework for analyzing content-based
restrictions in trademark registration.
This conclusion that the limited-public-forum doctrine applies
to trademark is especially important in evaluating the VPO bars
in light of a particular Supreme Court case, Cohen v. California.
There, a man was criminally prosecuted for wearing a jacket
containing the phrase “F— the Draft” in a state courthouse.169 In
holding that the state had violated his First Amendment right, the
Court noted that “words are often chosen as much for their emotive
as their cognitive force.”170 Cohen thus recognizes protection for
the F-word. But as Justice Sotomayor pointed out in her Brunetti
opinion, the context of Cohen is very different from the context of
trademark registration.171 A criminal prosecution for speaking a
profanity in a courthouse about a government policy is very
different from a denial of trademark registration for speaking the

165.
See Denying Trademark, supra note 104, at 2364–68 (arguing that trademark
system constitutes a limited public forum for purposes of evaluating speech restrictions).
But see Lisa P. Ramsey, A Free Speech Right to Trademark Protection?, 106 TRADEMARK
REP. 797, 877‒78 (2016) (concluding that bars to trademark registration should not be
analyzed under a public-forum framework).
166.
See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1753 (2017) (listing benefits of trademark
registration).
167.
The private speech consists of names of marks that will enable consumers to
identify the brand of good or service. See discussion supra Section III.C.1 (explaining the
purpose of trademark law).
168.
Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 682–83 (2010) (noting that the
subsidy nature of a school’s provision of resources for a student organization supported the
analytical framework of a limited public forum).
169.
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16 (1971).
170.
Id. at 26.
171.
Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2314‒15 (2019) (Sotomayor, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
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same profanity in commercial advertising.172 Speech restrictions
in Cohen would, under today’s doctrine, be subject to strict
scrutiny, whereas speech restrictions in the trademark context
should be subject to the standards of a limited public forum.173
As mentioned above, the limited-public-forum doctrine
requires, first, that content restrictions be reasonable in light of
the trademark system’s purpose, and second, that the restrictions
be viewpoint-neutral.174 With regard to the requirement of
reasonableness, as discussed in Part III above, the VPO bars
would reduce instances of public offense at modes of expression.175
Such offenses can impede commercial transactions in the
marketplace, which can undermine stability and orderliness in the
commercial marketplace.176 Simply put, highly offensive language
can make the commercial marketplace less inviting to the
public.177 Marks containing offensive language disrupt commercial
activity.178 Barring them is therefore a reasonable act by Congress
in light of the trademark system’s broad purpose of facilitating
commercial activity. The VPO bars thus satisfy the limited-publicforum doctrine’s requirement of reasonableness.
With regard to the doctrine’s requirement of viewpoint
neutrality, Section IV.B below discusses that issue.
B. Viewpoint Neutrality
Content discrimination targets either the content’s general
subject matter or its specific viewpoint.179 Discrimination based on
the subject matter occurs when the restriction targets a broad,
general category of expression, whereas viewpoint discrimination
occurs “when the specific motivating ideology or the opinion or
perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the restriction,”180 or
172.
Id. at 2314‒17 (contrasting the Cohen Court’s condemnation of the F-word as
viewpoint-neutral content discrimination with regulation against its use in the trademark
context under the limited-public-forum doctrine).
173.
Compare id., with Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010) (“Laws that
burden political speech are ‘subject to strict scrutiny’ . . . .”).
174.
See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995)
(quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985)).
175.
See discussion supra Section III.B.2.
176.
See Denying Trademark, supra note 104, at 2364–68 (arguing that offense at
marks impedes the purposes of trademark law).
177.
Id. at 2353–61.
178.
See id.
179.
See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829 (defining viewpoint discrimination as blatantly
occurring “[w]hen the government targets not subject matter, but particular views taken
by speakers on a subject”).
180.
Id.
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in other words, when the government “give[s] one side of a
debatable public question an advantage in expressing its views to
the people.”181
Under this understanding, the VPO bars would not be
viewpoint-discriminatory. They do not target any particular
opinion or ideology of a speaker, but rather, they target the general
category of words that are highly offensive to the public’s sense of
morality.182 The bars discriminate against vulgar, profane, or
obscene language without regard for any viewpoint that a speaker
may be asserting through such language.183 Hence, on their face,
the VPO bars would seem to be viewpoint-neutral.
Although this analysis may seem straightforward, the issue
of viewpoint neutrality is especially nuanced in the trademark
context. In the recent cases of Tam and Brunetti, the Court struck
down content-based bars to trademark registration that were
based on moral considerations.184 Both cases provide guidance on
viewpoint discrimination in the context of content-based
trademark bars.185 Hence, Tam and Brunetti must be studied
closely to understand whether bars to vulgar, profane, and obscene
marks would be subject to the same viewpoint-discriminatory
failing.
1. Matal v. Tam. In Tam, Mr. Simon Tam chose “The Slants”
as his band name in order to “reclaim” or “take ownership” of
stereotypes associated with persons of Asian descent.186 Mr. Tam
accordingly applied to register THE SLANTS as a federally
protected trademark.187 In response, the PTO found that the term
was offensive to Asians and thereby denied Mr. Tam’s application
for registration under the disparagement bar.188 The Supreme
Court, however, unanimously concluded that the disparagement
bar was viewpoint-discriminatory in violation of the First
Amendment.189
181.
McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 482–83 (2014).
182.
See Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2313–15 (2019) (Sotomayor, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (“A restriction on trademarks featuring obscenity, vulgarity,
or profanity is similarly viewpoint neutral, though it is naturally content-based.”).
183.
See, e.g., id. at 2308.
184.
See id. at 2298, 2302; Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1763–65 (2017) (plurality
opinion).
185.
See Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2298–2300; Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1753, 1763 (plurality
opinion).
186.
Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1754.
187.
Id.
188.
Id.
189.
Id. at 1751, 1753, 1765, 1769.
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Although the Court overwhelmingly reached the conclusion
that the disparagement bar was viewpoint-discriminatory, that
conclusion is, in one sense, puzzling. The disparagement bar did
not appear to target any specific ideology, opinion, or perspective
of the speaker.190 It did not give a particular side an advantage in
a public debate, applying equally to all debates—neither side was
allowed to disparage.191 Justice Alito wrote a plurality opinion that
recognized this fact, specifically noting: “[T]he [disparagement]
clause evenhandedly prohibits disparagement of all groups. It
applies equally to marks that damn Democrats and Republicans,
capitalists and socialists, and those arrayed on both sides of every
possible issue.”192 So, if the disparagement bar did not target any
specific viewpoint, how could it be viewpoint-discriminatory?
Justice Alito answered the question by explaining:
Giving offense is a viewpoint.
We have said time and again that “the public expression
of ideas may not be prohibited merely because the ideas are
themselves offensive to some of their hearers.” Street v. New
York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969). See also Texas v. Johnson,
491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (“If there is a bedrock principle
underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government
may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because
society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable”).193
According to Justice Alito, then, “[g]iving offense is a viewpoint.”194
But this statement should not be read in a vacuum. It does not
mean that any and all means of being offensive constitutes a
viewpoint. Rather, it means that speaking an offensive idea is a
viewpoint.
The necessity of offending through an idea is apparent in the
sentences that Justice Alito quotes after making this givingoffense statement. Specifically, Justice Alito quoted two prior
statements by the Court: first, “the public expression of ideas may
not be prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves offensive
to some of their hearers”;195 and second, “the government may not
prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the
idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”196 In both statements, the
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

Free Speech, supra note 111, at 1677–83.
Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1763 (plurality opinion).
Id.
Id. (citations omitted).
Id.
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969)).
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989)).
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Court made clear that the cause of the offense must be the idea
itself that the content communicates. Hence, the offense that Alito
characterized as a viewpoint must be the offense that arises in
response to the idea directly communicated by the expression.
Marks that disparage cause such offense. Disparaging marks
are those that offend through their ideas.197 That is, people take
offense because of the disparaging idea that the mark
communicates.198 Indeed, the disparaging examples that Justice
Alito cited as viewpoint-discriminatory exemplify targeting an
idea within the disparaging mark: “Down with racists,” “Down
with sexists,” and “Down with homophobes.”199 The ideas in these
examples consist of putting down racists, sexists, and
homophobes. Those ideas are offensive to those groups.
A concurring opinion by Justice Kennedy supports this
understanding. According to Justice Kennedy, the test for
viewpoint discrimination turns on whether “the government has
singled out a subset of messages for disfavor based on the views
expressed.”200 Viewpoint discrimination must be “based on the
views expressed,” or in other words, based on the ideas within the
expression. To speak disparaging ideas is to speak a viewpoint, so
the disparagement bar singles out speech based on an expressed
view. Like Justice Alito, Justice Kennedy explained viewpoint
discrimination in terms of targeting ideas within expression.
Another fact that explains the Tam holding of viewpoint
discrimination is the broad scope of the disparagement bar.
Because it applied to all disparaging content, it was impossible to
fully enforce.201 As a result, its application became “highly
subjective,” entirely based on PTO officers’ opinions about what is
inappropriately critical and what is not.202 The bar enabled the
PTO to pick and choose among competing ideas.203 Hence, the
general term disparage—without any stated viewpoint bias—
enabled the government to target particular opinions and
viewpoints.
The takeaway from Tam, then, is twofold. First, a bar to
registration cannot be based on the offensiveness of an idea in a
197.
See id.
198.
See id.
199.
Id. at 1765.
200.
Id. at 1766 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
201.
See, e.g., Minn. Voters All. v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876, 1891 (2018) (illustrating
that broad, “indeterminate” restrictions are more difficult to uphold than narrower
restrictions).
202.
Id. at 1756 n.5.
203.
See Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1753–54.
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mark. Second, a restriction cannot be so broad as to permit
subjective enforcement against particular ideas. Accordingly,
these principles must be applied to the VPO bars to determine
their viewpoint neutrality. That application is set forth below in
Section IV.B.3.
2. Iancu v. Brunetti. In Iancu v. Brunetti, a business owner
applied to register a mark that closely resembled the F-word as a
brand name for his clothing line.204 The PTO denied his application
under the Lanham Act’s bar that precluded registration of terms
that were “immoral” or “scandalous.”205 Reversing the PTO, the
Court struck down these bars as viewpoint-discriminatory.206
a. Immoral Bar. All nine members of the Court agreed that
the “immoral” bar was viewpoint-discriminatory in violation of the
First Amendment.207 Writing the Court’s opinion, Justice Kagan
explained:
[T]he Lanham Act permits registration of marks that
champion society’s sense of rectitude and morality, but not
marks that denigrate those concepts. . . . [T]he statute, on its
face, distinguishes between two opposed sets of ideas: those
aligned with conventional moral standards and those hostile
to them; those inducing societal nods of approval and those
provoking offense and condemnation. The statute favors the
former, and disfavors the latter.208
As the Court made clear here, the immoral bar enabled, and
indeed required, the government to pass judgment on whether
particular ideas were morally acceptable. Stated differently, the
immoral bar required the government to suppress ideas (by
denying trademark registration) that it deemed inappropriate.
This, according to the Court, was viewpoint-discriminatory.209
Like the disparagement bar, the immoral bar did not specify
which particular beliefs were immoral.210 The immoral bar did not
target any specific ideology, specific opinion, or specific
204.
Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2297 (2019).
205.
Id. at 2298.
206.
Id. at 2297.
207.
Id.
208.
Id. at 2299–2300.
209.
See id. at 2300.
210.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2018), invalidated in part by Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2294
(“No trademark . . . shall be refused registration on the principal register on account of its
nature unless it—(a) Consists of or comprises immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter; or
matter which may disparage or falsely suggest a connection with persons, living or dead,
institutions, beliefs, or national symbols . . . .”).
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perspective.211 Nevertheless, the immoral bar enabled the
government to target only the specific views that it found
unacceptable.212 It mandated enforcement against specific
viewpoints, akin to a restriction against any idea with which the
government disagreed.213 In the wake of Tam, the immoral bar
was inevitably viewpoint-discriminatory.214
Underlying the Court’s condemnation of the immoral bar was
another problematic aspect—vagueness. Although the Court did
not invoke the vagueness doctrine, the fact that the bar enabled
government officials to pick and choose which beliefs were
acceptable suggested vagueness problems.215 The bar failed to
provide notice about which types of marks were immoral, and it
impermissibly delegated policy matters for subject determination
by the PTO.216 In effect, then, its vagueness enabled viewpoint
discrimination.217
b. Scandalous Bar. The Brunetti Court split over whether
the scandalous bar was viewpoint-discriminatory.218 Writing for
five other Justices (i.e., Justices Alito, Thomas, Gorsuch,
Kavanaugh, and Ginsburg), Justice Kagan interpreted scandalous
as having an overlapping meaning with immoral, such that it also
required the PTO to judge whether a mark’s idea or viewpoint was
acceptable.219 The majority interpreted scandalous and immoral as
“overlapping terms” that should be read together to arrive at a
211.
See Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2300–01.
212.
See id. (noting examples of ideas that the PTO approved for trademark
registration and contrasting ideas that the PTO refused).
204.
See id. (“The facial viewpoint bias in the law results in viewpoint-discriminatory
application.”).
214.
Id. at 2301.
215.
See generally Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108‒09 (1972)
(explaining the dangers of a vague statute). Why did the Brunetti Court not invoke the
vagueness doctrine? The answer could be that the Court is generally reluctant where the
government act constitutes an economic subsidy for speech. See Nat’l Endowment for Arts
v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 589 (1998) (“In the context of selective subsidies, it is not always
feasible for Congress to legislate with clarity. Indeed, if this statute is unconstitutionally
vague, then so too are all Government programs awarding scholarships and grants on the
basis of subjective criteria such as ‘excellence.’”).
216.
See Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2298; cf. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108‒09.
217.
Cf. In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1341–43 (Fed. Cir. 2015), aff’d, 137 S. Ct. 1744
(2017) (recognizing that the vagueness of the disparagement bar “contributes significantly
to the chilling effect on speech”).
218.
See Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2294 (“Justice Alito filed a concurring opinion. Chief
Justice Roberts filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Justice Breyer
filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Justice Sotomayor, joined by
Justice Breyer, filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.”).
219.
See id. at 2299–2300.
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single meaning—ideas that are hostile to moral standards.220 For
the majority, the scandalous and immoral terms thus constituted
a single bar to registration.221 The majority regarded scandalous—
like immoral—as a term that called for a judgment about actual
ideas within a mark.222 It was, therefore, viewpointdiscriminatory.223
Justices Sotomayor, Breyer, and Roberts interpreted
scandalous very differently. Although each wrote separately, all
three Justices together reached the same basic interpretation of
scandalous. They interpreted scandalous as not requiring an
assessment of an idea contained within a mark, but rather, as
requiring an assessment of only the mode of expression.224 A mode
of expression is the way or manner of expressing an idea.225 The
Court had previously recognized that “[n]othing in the
Constitution prohibits the [government] from insisting that
certain modes of expression are inappropriate and subject to
sanctions.”226 According to the dissenting Justices, scandalous
may be interpreted to refer to modes of expressing an idea;
specifically, the modes of “obscenity, vulgarity, and profanity.”227

220.
Id. at 2300 (“Put the pair of overlapping terms together and the statute, on its
face, distinguishes between two opposed sets of ideas: those aligned with conventional
moral standards and those hostile to them; those inducing societal nods of approval and
those provoking offense and condemnation.”).
221.
See id. at 2299–2300.
222.
See id. at 2300. Justice Kagan provided a simple example to illustrate the point:
the marks LOVE RULES and ALWAYS BE GOOD as contrasted with the marks HATE
RULES and ALWAYS BE CRUEL. Id. The PTO would judge the ideas expressed in the
first two marks to be moral and the ideas expressed in the second two marks to be immoral.
See id.
223.
Id.
224.
See id. at 2303 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(“Standing alone, the term ‘scandalous’ need not be understood to reach marks that offend
because of the ideas they convey; it can be read more narrowly to bar only marks that offend
because of their mode of expression . . . .”); id. at 2304 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (“[W]e should interpret the word ‘scandalous’ in the present statute to
refer only to certain highly ‘vulgar’ or ‘obscene’ modes of expression.”); id. at 2308–11
(Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (recognizing that scandalous “can
be read narrowly (to cover only offensive modes of expression)”).
225.
Mode, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining mode as “a manner
of . . . doing something”).
226.
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986).
227.
See Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2308 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (interpreting scandalous “to address only obscenity, vulgarity, and profanity”); id.
at 2303 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (explaining that
scandalous can be interpreted to apply to only marks “that are obscene, vulgar, or profane”);
id. at 2304 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (interpreting scandalous
as referring to certain marks that are “highly ‘vulgar’ or ‘obscene’”).
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Responding to this argument, the Brunetti majority rejected
this argument that scandalous targets only modes of expressing
ideas.228 In the majority’s view, the Lanham Act did not clearly
limit scandalous only to modes that are offensive, independent of
any viewpoint contained in a mark.229 For the majority, scandalous
included both the modes of expression and the ideas that are
offensive.230
The upshot of Brunetti, then, is that where a bar to
registration requires the PTO to pass judgment on an idea
contained within a mark, that bar is viewpoint-discriminatory.231
As a corollary to this principle, the Court implicitly recognized that
restrictions on modes of expression do not require the PTO to pass
judgment on an idea within a mark.232 The next Section applies
these principles to the VPO bars.
3. VPO Bars. A surface understanding of Tam and Brunetti
might suggest that the VPO bars are viewpoint-discriminatory.
The Tam Court condemned a bar that restricted offensive
marks,233 and the VPO bars target vulgar, profane, and obscene
marks specifically because they are so offensive.234 As Alito noted,
“[g]iving offense is a viewpoint.”235 At first glance, then, the highly
offensive nature of vulgar, profane, and obscene marks would
seem to represent a protected viewpoint. Likewise, Brunetti
condemned bars that denied protection based on a view that
certain marks were immoral,236 and the VPO bars deny protection
based on the view that vulgar, profane, and obscene marks are
immoral.237 Thus, if construed in this way, Tam and Brunetti
would imply the unconstitutionality of the VPO bars.
But of course, construing Tam and Brunetti in this way would
not be correct. As discussed in the Section above, Tam teaches that
viewpoint discrimination exists where a bar restricts a mark
228.
Id. at 2302 n.*.
229.
Id. at 2301–02, 2302 n.*.
230.
Id.
231.
See id. at 2300–02.
232.
See id. at 2301–02, 2302 n.*.
233.
See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1751 (2017) (“Speech may not be banned on
the ground that it expresses ideas that offend.”).
234.
See discussion supra Part III (arguing that trademark registration should be
denied for vulgar, profane, and obscene marks specifically because they are highly offensive
to the general public).
235.
Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1763 (plurality opinion).
236.
See Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2300–01.
237.
See discussion supra Section III.A (observing the general opinion that use of
vulgar, profane, and obscene language is immoral).
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owner’s ability to speak critically of an idea (because the bar
targets offensive ideas).238 It further teaches that viewpoint
discrimination exists where the subject matter of the bar is so
broad that it invites subjective application, such that the PTO
picks which ideas should win in the marketplace.239 Brunetti
teaches that viewpoint discrimination exists where a bar requires
the PTO to pass judgment on an idea.240 Thus, under these
principles that underlie the holdings of Tam and Brunetti, the
constitutional questions relevant to the VPO bars are the
following: (1) whether the VPO bars target ideas that are
offensive; and (2) whether the VPO bars invite the PTO to apply
its own judgment about whether an idea is unacceptable. As
discussed below, the answers to these questions indicate that the
VPO bars are not viewpoint-discriminatory.
Question 1
Do the VPO bars target ideas that are offensive? The VPO
bars restrict a mark owner’s ability to engage in crude, coarse, and
base manners of speaking.241 They do not restrict the ability to
speak ideas that are offensive or critical.242 Any criticism asserted,
or offense caused, by an idea within a mark is not the reason for
denying a mark that contains immoral language.243 The mark’s
language is offensive, independent of any offensiveness of the idea
itself.244 The F-word, for instance, is highly offensive, regardless of
whether the idea that it emphasizes is itself offensive. F—ING
GOOD CHICKEN is offensive, whereas that mark’s idea—that the
chicken tastes very good—is not.245 The purpose, then, of barring
immoral language is to prevent offense at the mode of

238.
See discussion supra Section IV.B.1.
239.
See id.
240.
See discussion supra Section IV.B.2.
241.
See discussion supra Section III.A (explaining that the reason for offense is the
crude portrayal of ideas).
242.
See discussion supra Part II (illustrating that inappropriate ideas that do not use
vulgar, profane, or obscene language would not be denied trademark protection).
243.
See discussion supra Part III.
244.
See generally R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 385 (1992) (“The proposition
that a particular instance of speech can be proscribable on the basis of one feature (e.g.,
obscenity) but not on the basis of another (e.g., opposition to the city government) is
commonplace.”); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986) (“Nothing in
the Constitution prohibits the [government] from insisting that certain modes of expression
are inappropriate and subject to sanctions.”).
245.
See discussion supra Section III.A (analyzing F—ING GOOD CHICKEN
example).
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communicating the idea.246 It is not to prevent criticism by, or
offense taken from, the idea itself.
This distinction between offense at an idea and offense at a
mode is therefore key to the constitutionality of the VPO bars.247
The distinction is apparent in Alito’s plurality opinion in Tam,
where he declared that “[g]iving offense is a viewpoint.”248 As
discussed above, the context of Alito’s opinion implies that giving
offense based on an idea is a viewpoint.249 Alito was not speaking
about giving offense through a mode of expression. Indeed, at the
beginning of the Tam decision, where he briefly wrote for the
unanimous Court, Alito explained the offense in terms of an
expression’s idea: “Speech may not be banned on the ground that
it expresses ideas that offend.”250 It appears clear, then, that Alito
was not opining about offenses that derive from the mode of
expression.
This same distinction between an offense caused by a mode
and an offense caused by an idea is further apparent in the
Brunetti majority opinion. In arguing that the scandalous bar also
requires a judgment about the acceptability of an idea (like the
immoral bar), Justice Kagan explained: “[T]he category of
scandalous marks thus includes both marks that offend by the
ideas they convey and marks that offend by their mode of
expression. And its coverage of the former means that it
discriminates based on viewpoint.”251 Kagan’s reasoning is clear:
the offense from an idea is different from the offense from a mode,
and it is the idea offense—not the mode offense—that results in
viewpoint discrimination.252 Implicitly, her reasoning indicates
that offenses caused by modes are not viewpoint-discriminatory.253
246.
Cf. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 393 (“[T]he reason why fighting words are categorically
excluded from the protection of the First Amendment is not that their content
communicates any particular idea, but that their content embodies a particularly
intolerable (and socially unnecessary) mode of expressing whatever idea the speaker wishes
to convey.”).
247.
See Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2313–14 (2019) (Sotomayor, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (recognizing the distinction between ideas within a mark
and the modes of expressing those ideas).
248.
Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1763 (2017) (plurality opinion).
249.
See discussion supra Section IV.B.1 (explaining that offense as a protected
viewpoint is only with respect to ideas that are offensive).
250.
Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1751 (emphasis added).
251.
Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2302 n.* (second and fourth emphases added).
252.
See id.
253.
See id. (“We say nothing at all about a statute that covers only the latter—or, in
the Government’s more concrete description, a statute limited to lewd, sexually explicit,
and profane marks.”).
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Question 2
Do the VPO bars invite the PTO to apply its own judgment
about whether an idea should be denied (which would be
condemned by Brunetti and Tam)? The answer to this question is
no. Because the bars do not target ideas, they do not call for any
judgment about an idea. The VPO bars require a judgment about
whether specific language is vulgar, profane, or obscene, but not a
judgment about the ideas that the language communicates.254
Importantly, the judgment about whether language is vulgar,
profane, or obscene does not depend on individual moral values of
PTO officers. The VPO bars are not hopelessly vague like the
immoral bar. There is an established public understanding of
words and images that comprise vulgar, profane, and obscene
language.255 The FCC, for instance, already employs objective
standards to define these categories.256 Particular words, specific
bodily functions, specific body parts, and specific religious
references are identified as comprising the content of vulgar,
profane, and obscene language.257 Therefore, the PTO would
neither apply its own judgment about any idea nor apply its own
judgment about the meaning of the immoral language. Consistent
with Tam and Brunetti, the VPO bars would not invite subjective
application of moral judgments.
One might argue that changing moral standards would make
the VPO bars vague. What is vulgar today may become acceptable
tomorrow. Yet a standard that depends on the public’s changing
understanding of a word does not imply that a trademark standard
is vague.258 Trademark law already recognizes standards for
protection that depend on meanings that change.259 The bar to
generic marks calls for an evaluation of whether the meaning of a

254.
See discussion supra Section III.A (explaining basis for public offense of immoral
language).
255.
See discussion supra Part III (explaining meanings of vulgarity, profanity, and
obscenity).
256.
See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 506–10 (2009) (explaining
FCC’s interpretation and enforcement of indecency statute); Obscene, Indecent and Profane
Broadcasts, supra note 61.
257.
See discussion supra Part III.
258.
See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (providing trademark protection for marks that
“become distinctive”).
259.
See id.; cf. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 58 (2010) (“[T]he standard of extreme
cruelty is not merely descriptive, but necessarily embodies a moral judgment. The standard
itself remains the same, but its applicability must change as the basic mores of society
change.”).
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word has become generic over time.260 The bar to descriptive
marks may be overcome if a proponent can show that the mark
has gained public recognition of the mark (i.e., secondary
meaning).261 Application of these bars depends on the public’s
understanding of meaning, which can change over time.262
Changing public understanding of a word does not make a
trademark bar vague.
C. Judicial Support for VPO Bars
This conclusion that the VPO bars are viewpoint-neutral
draws support from statements by several Justices in the Brunetti
case.263 Several Justices indicated that denying trademark
registration for marks that are vulgar, profane, or obscene would
be constitutional. Quoted below are their statements.
Chief Justice Roberts stated:
I also agree that . . . refusing registration to obscene, vulgar,
or profane marks does not offend the First
Amendment. . . . The Government . . . has an interest in not
associating itself with trademarks whose content is obscene,
vulgar, or profane. The First Amendment protects the
freedom of speech; it does not require the Government to give
aid and comfort to those using obscene, vulgar, and profane
modes of expression.264
Justice Alito stated:
Our decision does not prevent Congress from adopting a
more carefully focused statute that precludes the
registration of marks containing vulgar terms that play no
real part in the expression of ideas. The particular mark in
260.
See, e.g., Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505, 511 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (holding
that fanciful mark ASPIRIN had become generic over time and thereby lost trademark
protection). The word cellophane once communicated brand, but it quickly became generic
through public usage. See DuPont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prods. Co., 85 F.2d 75, 80 (2d
Cir. 1936).
261.
See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f). The changing meaning of words leads to difficulty in
applying trademark standards that determine protection. See, e.g., Thompson Med. Co. v.
Pfizer Inc., 753 F.2d 208, 213 n.8 (“[B]ecause generic marks cannot be protected even upon
a showing of secondary meaning, courts increasingly have been called upon to delineate the
chimerical line between the descriptive and the generic.”).
262.
See USPTO v. Booking.com B.V., No. 19-46, slip op. at 3 (U.S. June 30, 2020)
(“[T]o be placed on the principal register, descriptive terms must achieve significance ‘in
the minds of the public’ as identifying the applicant’s goods or services—a quality called
‘acquired distinctiveness’ or ‘secondary meaning.’” (quoting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 211 (2000))).
263.
See supra note 6.
264.
Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2303–04 (2019) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
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question in this case could be denied registration under such
a statute. The term suggested by that mark is not needed to
express any idea and, in fact, as commonly used today,
generally signifies nothing except emotion and a severely
limited vocabulary. The registration of such marks serves
only to further coarsen our popular culture.265

Justice Breyer stated:
[I]t is hard to see how a statute prohibiting the registration
of only highly vulgar or obscene words discriminates based
on “viewpoint.” Of course, such words often evoke powerful
emotions. Standing by themselves, however, these words do
not typically convey any particular viewpoint.266
Justice Sotomayor stated:
Adopting a narrow construction for the word “scandalous”—
interpreting it to regulate only obscenity, vulgarity, and
profanity—would save it from unconstitutionality. . . .
....
. . . To treat a restriction on vulgarity, profanity, or obscenity
as viewpoint discrimination would upend decades of
precedent.
....
Prohibiting the registration of obscene, profane, or vulgar
marks qualifies as reasonable, viewpoint-neutral, contentbased regulation. . . . The Government has a reasonable
interest in refraining from lending its ancillary support to
marks that are obscene, vulgar, or profane.267
Writing for the Court majority, Justice Kagan suggested
(without explicitly stating) that the VPO bars would be
constitutional.268 Specifically, while drawing the distinction
between offenses based on ideas that marks convey and offenses
based on modes of expression, Justice Kagan contrasted the
immoral and scandalous bars with bars that target marks that are
“lewd” (which is akin to vulgar), “sexually explicit” (which is akin
to obscene), and “profane.”269 She stated:
The statute as written does not draw the line at lewd,
sexually explicit, or profane marks. Nor does it refer only to
marks whose “mode of expression,” independent of
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.

Id. at 2303 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 2306 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 2313–14, 2317 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
See id. at 2301–02.
Id.
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viewpoint, is particularly offensive. It covers the universe of
immoral or scandalous—or (to use some PTO synonyms)
offensive or disreputable—material. Whether or not lewd or
profane. Whether the scandal and immorality comes from
mode or instead from viewpoint.270

This contrast between the immoral and scandalous bars and
“lewd, sexually explicit, [and] profane” bars suggests that Kagan
views the latter group as constitutional.
Thus, four Justices explicitly indicated that barring either
vulgar, profane, or obscene modes of expression would be
constitutional. Specifically, Justices Roberts and Sotomayor
expressly condoned bars to “vulgar,” “profane,” and “obscene”
modes of expression;271 Justice Breyer condoned bars to “vulgar”
and “obscene” modes (and referred to “profane” in a supporting
parenthetical);272 and Justice Alito condoned a bar to the “vulgar”
mode.273 The remaining five Justices, through the majority opinion
written by Justice Kagan, recognized a distinction between the
bars that target immoral and scandalous content and the bars that
target modes of expression that are lewd, sexually explicit, and
profane.274
D. Speech Theory
Although free-speech doctrine may be interpreted as being
consistent with the VPO bars, exceptions to core free-speech
principles should be applied with caution. Doctrines are inherently
flexible, always able to change for exceptional circumstances. The
danger of flexible application is that exceptions may arise where
the reason for the exception, in view of the reason for the doctrine,
does not seem justifiable. To guard against this possibility, the law
should respect the theory underlying the doctrine. Only if the
exception is consistent with the theory should it apply.
Accordingly, this Section analyzes whether the VPO bars are
justified in view of the theory that underlies free-speech doctrine.
The examination of theory proceeds in two parts. The first
part considers whether a particular speech theory should govern
the theoretical analysis of the VPO bars. It concludes that only the

270.
Id. (citation omitted).
271.
Id. at 2303–04 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at
2313–14, 2317 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
272.
Id. at 2307 (Breyer, J., concurring and dissenting in part).
273.
Id. at 2303 (plurality opinion).
274.
Id. at 2301–02.
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marketplace-of-ideas theory should govern the analysis.275 The
second part performs that analysis. Arguing that vulgar, profane,
and obscene marks are harmful to the marketplace of ideas, it
concludes that the theory supports the VPO bars.276
1. Speech Theories and Trademarks. Various theories
underlie the right of free speech.277 Marketplace of ideas,
individual liberty, and democratic self-governance are perhaps the
most commonly cited.278 Marketplace theory posits that the
purpose of speech protection is to provide a forum for testing the
truth of ideas.279 As ideas compete for public acceptance without
government interference, truthful ideas have the best opportunity
to prevail—according to the theory.280 By contrast, individualliberty theory recognizes speech as an end in and of itself.281 The
speech right exists for individuals to realize self-identity and
fulfillment.282 Finally, democratic self-governance theory
recognizes that the right of free speech is absolute with respect to
speech related to self-governance in a democracy.283 Other types of
speech may be regulated.284
Of these theories, the marketplace of ideas seems most
appropriate to evaluate content-based restrictions on trademark
registration. When speaking a message through a trademark, a
speaker is seeking for the mark to be accepted in the commercial
marketplace.285 In other words, the trademark exists to gain public
recognition, and more specifically, it exists to distinguish itself as

275.
See discussion infra Section IV.D.1.
276.
See discussion infra Section IV.D.2.
277.
See 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 2:3
(2018) (recognizing three classic theories of free speech: “marketplace of ideas”; “human
dignity and self-fulfillment”; and “democratic self-governance”).
278.
See id.
279.
See generally Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) (articulating the theory of marketplace of ideas as “the best test of truth”).
280.
See SMOLLA, supra note 277, § 2:19 (“The marketplace theory is thus best
understood not as a guarantor of the final conquest of truth, but rather as a defense of the
process of an open marketplace.”).
281.
See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485, 503 (1984) (“The First
Amendment presupposes that the freedom to speak one’s mind is . . . an aspect of individual
liberty—and thus a good unto itself.”).
282.
See SMOLLA, supra note 277.
283.
See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELFGOVERNMENT 26 (1948).
284.
See id.
285.
See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995) (articulating the
purpose of trademark law).
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superior to other competing goods.286 As consumers form opinions
about the good associated with the mark, the mark captures the
reputation of the mark’s owner in comparison to other
competitors.287 Hence, the purpose of a person’s speech through a
trademark is to establish reputational distinction among
competing goods in the eyes of consumers.288
This purpose aligns well with marketplace theory. As already
stated, the purpose of speech under marketplace theory is for ideas
to compete against other ideas, with the public determining which
ideas prevail.289 Just as ideas compete for public acceptance in the
marketplace of ideas, marks compete for consumer recognition in
the marketplace of commerce.290 Marks represent a specific subset
of ideas, and consumers represent a specific subset of the public.
Accordingly, the purpose of marks in the marketplace of commerce
reflects a specific application of the purpose of ideas in the
marketplace of ideas—competition with other ideas for public
acceptance.
Of course, speakers might employ trademarks for the purpose
of exercising individual liberty or exercising democratic selfgovernance. A seller, for instance, might use her own name as a
mark for the purpose of gaining a sense of personal satisfaction:
her name as a mark might provide self-fulfillment and selfidentity.291 Likewise, a person might use a political slogan as a
mark to further the democratic process.292 In those instances,
these other theories of speech law seem relevant to speech made
through trademarks.
These situations, however, do not imply that the restrictions
on registration of a trademark should be evaluated according to
these other theories. Recall that registration provides mark
owners a right to exclude others from using the mark.293 That
benefit of exclusion would not seem valuable to a mark owner who
286.
See id. (“[Trademark] law helps assure a producer that it (and not an imitating
competitor) will reap the financial, reputation-related rewards associated with a desirable
product.”).
287.
Id.
288.
See id.
289.
See discussion supra Section IV.D.1.
290.
See Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 164–65; cf. Standard Oil Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 252
F.2d 65, 75 (10th Cir. 1958) (noting that public recognition may establish whether a
trademark has achieved secondary meaning).
291.
E.g., Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1754 (2017) (“[Mr. Tam] chose this moniker
[THE SLANTS] in order to ‘reclaim’ and ‘take ownership’ of stereotypes about people of
Asian ethnicity.”).
292.
E.g., BEN CARSON FOR PRESIDENT 2016, Registration No. 4,890,768.
293.
See USPTO, supra note 109, at 11–12 (describing the benefits of a trademark).
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uses the mark to exercise individual liberty or democratic selfgovernance. The mark owner who is exercising individual liberty
through the mark is not concerned whether others replicate her
mark, for she is only concerned about realizing her own selffulfillment through her speech. Similarly, the mark owner who is
using the mark to exercise self-governance would not oppose
another who replicated the mark, and in fact, would likely be in
favor of that replication; the repetition would only serve to
strengthen support for the democratic idea expressed through the
mark. Hence, the restrictive nature of the VPO bars would seem to
have minimal effect on speech expressed to realize individualliberty or self-governance interests.
One might argue that the trademark rights are important to
these other speech interests because they facilitate economic gain
for speakers. That gain supports continued speech, which would
again be made for realizing individual liberty and democratic selfgovernance. For instance, the ADIDAS® mark is named after its
founder, Adi Dassler.294 Suppose that Adi realizes self-fulfillment
by using his name as the mark. Adi’s trademark rights over
ADIDAS® enables him (or his company) to realize profits, from
which Adi can make and sell more shoes with the ADIDAS® mark,
ultimately yielding further self-fulfillment. In this way, trademark
rights may be valued by those who use marks to realize individual
liberty or democratic self-governance.
Although the trademark rights may be valued by speakers
with these individual liberty and self-governance interests, this
fact does not imply that content restrictions on marks should be
evaluated through these other theories. Even though mark owners
may speak for purposes other than to gain market recognition, the
value that those mark owners realize from being able to enforce
their rights in a mark does depend on market recognition. In the
example above, Adi cannot make more shoes with his name on
them unless his brand has gained sufficient market recognition to
perpetuate demand. Adi must rely on the market recognizing his
marks. Reliance on the market implies that the speaker (Adi) must
speak for the purpose of gaining market recognition, even if the
ultimate purpose may be self-fulfillment. And if market
recognition is one purpose, the speaker is necessarily seeking for
her idea to prevail over another. Hence, to the extent that
trademark rights matter to a speaker (such that they should not
be restricted), they matter for the purpose of gaining consumer
294.
History, ADIDAS GRP., https://www.adidas-group.com/en/group/history/ [https://pe
rma.cc/J69K-UTZC] (last visited Sept. 26, 2020).
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recognition of the mark, which aligns only with marketplace
theory. Marketplace theory is thus the appropriate lens through
which to evaluate content-based restrictions on trademark
eligibility.
2. VPO Bars Under Marketplace Theory. How would
trademark bars to vulgar, profane, and obscene language affect
the marketplace of ideas? As a preliminary point, it is important
to note that such bars would not impede any ideas from reaching
that marketplace. The bars would target only modes of expressing
ideas—not actual ideas contained within a mark.295 Although
speakers would not be able to use the immoral language as a
means for proclaiming ideas in the marketplace, the ideas
themselves could still enter the marketplace and compete against
others. So, without employing vulgar, profane, or obscene
language, speakers could still freely communicate their ideas
contained in trademarks.
Nevertheless, restricting these offensive modes may affect the
performance of an idea in the marketplace. The offensiveness of
immoral language could serve to attract attention to the idea. F—
THE DRAFT enters the marketplace of ideas with much greater
force than I HATE THE DRAFT. Without immoral language, the
emotive force of a mark may not be as strong, which could affect
the attention that the mark receives in the marketplace of ideas.296
This decreased attention, to a certain extent and in some
circumstances, could affect the speaker’s ability to get his or her
point across. Hence, there is a cost to restricting offensive modes.
In the context of commercial trademarks, this cost appears
worthwhile. Much of the public prefers not to experience
commercial speech that is highly offensive—so much so that the
offensiveness of the immoral language may interfere with the
public even contemplating an idea.297 The message gets lost in the
delivery. For instance, if a speaker chooses F—ING GOOD
CHICKEN as his mark, some consumers are likely to refuse to test
whether the speaker’s claim is true (about the tastiness of the
chicken) simply because the F-word is used as a mode of
295.
See discussion supra Section III.B.1 (explaining that the immoral language is a
method of communication); discussion supra Section IV.B.3 (observing that the immoral
language is a mode of expression).
296.
See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25–26 (1971) (recognizing First Amendment
protection for emotive force of F-word given that “words are often chosen as much for their
emotive as their cognitive force”).
297.
See discussion supra Section III.B.2 (discussing negative effects of introducing
immoral language into trademarks).
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expressing the idea. Others, though, will not care about the use of
the F-word because it is not offensive to them, suggesting that the
F-word does not accomplish its purpose of providing emotive force
through offensive language. Others may be offended but still try
the chicken; yet as they continue to encounter such language, they
will likely become less offended, again decreasing the emotive
force of the F-word.298 As immoral language becomes more
common in trademarks, some consumers are likely to avoid
trademarks wherever possible.299 Hence, use of the immoral
language in marks will either decrease public participation in the
commercial marketplace (thereby decreasing participation in the
marketplace of ideas) or the use will weaken the offensiveness of
the language in contravention to the very purpose for using that
language. Put more simply, use of immoral language will either
thwart participation in the marketplace or undermine the purpose
of bringing attention to an idea. Therefore, barring vulgar,
profane, and obscene marks supports a well-functioning
marketplace of ideas.
V.CONCLUSION
Vulgar, profane, and obscene marks threaten a core purpose
of commerce. That purpose is not merely to facilitate economic
gain for certain members of the public. Commerce serves a more
fundamental purpose—a purpose that “is integral to the fabric of
a peaceful society.”300 The commercial marketplace facilitates
peaceful interactions between citizens who have disparate
backgrounds, beliefs, and behaviors. Its role is crucial in a
democracy that consists of a diverse and pluralistic society.
Opposing beliefs about religion, ideology, and politics all yield to
commercial opportunities. Commerce, then, promotes civil
dialogue and trust between people who often hold disparate beliefs
and value systems.
Vulgarity, profanity, and obscenity disrupt this purpose of
commerce. They create an atmosphere that is offensive, that is
emotionally
provocative,
and
that
thwarts
universal
301
participation.
As the norm for commercial dialogue begins to
reflect such base and course modes of communication, members of
the public are less likely to feel welcome in the marketplace of
298.
See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
299.
See discussion supra Section III.B.2.
300.
Ned Snow, Moral Judgments in Trademark Law, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 1093, 1105–
06 (2017).
301.
See discussion supra Sections III.B.1–2.
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commerce.302 Crudeness replaces civility. Confrontational offense
quickly overtakes peaceful cooperation.303 Vulgar, profane, and
obscene communication subtly but effectively erode a fundamental
purpose of commerce—establishing a civil society.
Thus, the law should encourage civility in commercial
transactions. To that end, trademark law plays a critical role.304
Trademark represents the means for communicating commercial
propositions. Civil dialogue in trademarks implies civility in
commercial transactions. As trademark law discourages vulgar,
profane, and obscene language, it promotes peaceful interactions
between market participants. Trademark law represents an
indirect means for the government to promote civility in the
commercial marketplace.
To be sure, the law must protect the freedom of mark owners
to freely speak through their marks. The commercial marketplace
is a forum for speaking about any idea—commercial or otherwise.
But that right to speak has limits. The speech must not threaten
the very forum in which persons seek to exercise their right of
speech. Vulgar, profane, and obscene marks threaten that
forum.305 Those sorts of marks must therefore be discouraged by
denying them trademark protection.
Doctrinally, such a denial is consistent with free-speech
jurisprudence.306 The recent cases of Matal v. Tam and Iancu v.
Brunetti are consistent with Congress enacting the VPO bars.307
Tam’s teaching that giving offense is a viewpoint is only with
respect to offense caused by ideas within the marks—not offense
that results from certain modes of expression.308 Brunetti’s
teaching that the government should not pass judgment on ideas
within a mark does not apply to offensive modes of expression that
a mark may employ.309 Accordingly, the VPO bars survive the
holdings of Tam and Brunetti.310
302.
See discussion supra Section III.B.2.
303.
See Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2307 (2019) (Breyer, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (“[Vulgar marks] may lead to the creation of public spaces that many
will find repellant, perhaps on occasion creating the risk of verbal altercations or even
physical confrontations. (Just think about how you might react if you saw someone wearing
a t-shirt or using a product emblazoned with an odious racial epithet.)”).
304.
See discussion supra Section III.C.
305.
See discussion supra Section IV.D.
306.
See discussion supra Section IV.C.
307.
See discussion supra Section IV.B.
308.
See discussion supra Section IV.B.1.
309.
See discussion supra Section IV.B.2.
310.
See discussion supra Section IV.B.3.
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Congress must act soon, though. Before the commercial
marketplace begins to more fully adopt immoral language as
trademarks, Congress must deny protection.311 As time passes,
businesses begin to expect that such bars will never be in place.
Expectations become settled, so that businesses begin investing in
vulgar, profane, and obscene marks, all of which promise to
emotionally grab the attention of potential consumers. As that
investment occurs, Congress will find it politically difficult to bar
the language. So, although today the bars will easily pass as a
simple amendment to the Lanham Act, tomorrow is not as certain.
Congress must immediately enact the VPO bars.

311.

See discussion supra Section III.C.2.

